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The Subtlety of State Action in 
Privatized Child Welfare Services 
Sacha M. Coupet* 
[H]e [who] acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s 
power, his act is that of the State.  This must be so, or the constitutional prohibi-
tion [against deprivation of property, life or liberty] has no meaning.  Then the 
State has clothed one of its agents with power to annul or to evade it.  
Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879). 
INTRODUCTION 
In ever increasing numbers, public agencies are contracting with the 
private sector to provide services and benefits—once assumed to be go-
vernmental “duties”—that had long been delivered primarily through pub-
lic channels.  Examples include, among others, privatized nursing home 
care, privatized prisons, and private military forces.  Despite some adverse 
outcomes, broad shifts in service delivery continue unabated, and, accord-
ing to some, “seem to be occurring especially around collective commit-
ments to provide for the basic human needs for food, shelter, education, 
medical care, and justice.”1  It is therefore not surprising that we are wit-
nessing a significant increase in the rate of private participation in child 
welfare services,2 defined here as privately delivered out-of-home care for 
children formally placed by the state in the child welfare system and in the 
custody of the state.3 
Far from a recent phenomenon, public-private partnerships have a 
 * Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Research, Civitas Childlaw Center, Loyola Univer-
sity Chicago School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., University of Michigan.  For their 
insight and encouragement, many thanks to Spencer Waller, Solangel Maldonado, Ellen Marrus, Barba-
ra Bennett Woodhouse, Twila Perry, Ruqaiijah Yearby, Arthur Jarrett, Joseph Farrell, and Lee Clark.  I 
am deeply grateful to the exceptional research assistance of Riya S. Shah and Ashley Baek.  All errors 
are my own.  Lastly, my sincere thanks to the Chapman Law Review for their diligent editing. 
 1 MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 22 (2002).  
See also Robin A. Johnson, States Expand Privatization of Social Services, 10 INTELL. AMMUNITION 10 
(2001) (“[a] 1997 Council of State Governments survey found that social service agencies were the 
state departments most likely to report increasing their use of privatization over time.  More than 85 
percent of the responding agencies reported they had increased privatization in the five years prior to 
the survey.  Seventy-five percent of respondents indicated they planned to increase privatization in the 
next five years.”). 
 2 Marguerite G. Rosenthal, Public or Private Children’s Services?: Privatization in Retrospect, 
74 SOC. SERV. REV. 281 (2000). 
 3 For the purposes of this article, the term child welfare system is used to mean the entire spec-
trum of services available for minors involved in the dependency, but not the juvenile delinquency sys-
tems. 
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long history in child welfare practice, beginning with the period immediate-
ly following the Revolutionary War.  From the inception of the union, the 
care of destitute and needy children has been characterized by a unique 
blend of private agency support coupled with public funding, regulation, 
and oversight.4  However, the contemporary trend toward privatization ap-
pears anomalous in both its impetus and in the potentially deleterious con-
sequences for recipients.  Although recent privatization initiatives may be 
similarly “built on a [simple] model of using federal funds . . . to purchase 
services or care from private providers,”5 they differ in, among other 
attributes, their attraction for a market approach and an orientation toward 
profit.  Indeed, the proliferation of privatization and its embrace of a mar-
ket approach has been both heralded as an exemplary and innovative social 
service strategy and lamented as a harbinger of the feared commodification 
of our most intimate and cherished investments—our children and fami-
lies.6 
Despite acknowledged risks inherent in the shift from public to private 
human services, especially as it relates to child welfare, “there is scant pub-
lic debate about whether [public-private partnerships] jeopardize public 
commitments to equality, due process, [civil rights,] and democracy.”7  In-
cluded among the less explored aspects of privatization is the shift in risk 
assessment that occurs within public-private contracting and all the atten-
dant consequences of risk assessment for state agencies and service reci-
pients.  For all the potential benefits that may come to fruition through con-
tinued privatization efforts, there are problems encountered with the 
delegation of authority and responsibility from public to private providers, 
particularly when the civil rights of recipients are curtailed by virtue of the 
ostensibly private garb in which service delivery is cloaked.  Indeed, while 
the drive to privatize the delivery of public services continues unabated—
too little attention is focused on the impact of privatization on the diminu-
 4 HOMER FOLKS, THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN 13 
(1902). 
 5 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 294. 
 6 Use of the term “commodification” is meant to suggest that service and support of families, 
particularly poor families of color, continues to grow into a marketable enterprise.  I am referring more 
so to the broader conception of commodification noted in Margaret Radin’s seminal work.  According 
to Radin, 
Narrowly construed, commodification describes actual buying and selling (or legally per-
mitted buying and selling) of something.  Broadly construed, commodification includes not 
only actual buying and selling, but also market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about inte-
ractions as if they were sale transactions, and market methodology, the use of monetary 
cost-benefit analysis to judge these interactions.  Universal commodification embraces this 
broad construction in its most expansive form, limiting actual buying and selling only by 
the dictates of market methodology, and solving problems of contested commodification by 
making everything in principle a commodity. 
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (1987).  For a critique of 
the commodification of vulnerable children and families, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Making 
Poor Mothers Fungible: The Privatization of Foster Care, in CHILD CARE AND INEQUALITY: 
RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 83 (Francesca M. Canican, et al. eds.,  2002). 
 7 MINOW, supra note 1, at 2. 
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tion of constitutional protections for service recipients.8  Although 
“[r]ecent expansions in privatization of government programs mean that the 
constitutional paradigm of a sharp separation between public and private is 
increasingly at odds with the blurred public-private character of modern 
governance[,] . . . little effort has been made to address [the] disconnect be-
tween constitutional law and new administrative realit[ies].”9 There is, in-
deed, substantial evidence that “the growth of government contracting, 
coupled with an unrealistic and narrow understanding of state action, has 
created jurisprudence . . . ’significantly underprotective of constitutional 
rights.’”10 
The thesis of this article is that in failing to sufficiently key the current 
state action doctrine to the present reality of privatization, courts do not 
adequately protect the rights of children and families caught in the swell of 
the child welfare privatization initiative.  All too often, a private party 
dressed in state clothes is permitted to escape civil rights liability owing to 
an anachronistic state action doctrine that fails to reflect the unique dimen-
sions of child welfare service delivery.  Although traditional tort remedies 
remain, they fail to appropriately reflect the abuse of state authority and are 
less likely to affect systemic social norms that constitutional tort claims 
might.  This article highlights the unique role of the state in this particular 
public-private partnership, the appropriateness of extending the analogy be-
tween foster children to other incapacitated or restrained individuals, and 
the role of § 1983 as a mechanism of redress.11  It also explores the ratio-
nale for holding private providers of child welfare services liable as state 
actors for constitutional deprivations.12  A rich discussion pertaining to the 
 8 Harold J. Sullivan, Privatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional 
Rights, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 461, 461–67 (1987). 
 9 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1367, 1367 (2003). 
 10 Sheila S. Kennedy, When is Private Public?: State Action in the Era of Privatization and Pub-
lic-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203, 204 (2001). 
 11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal statute which permits plaintiffs to challenge deprivation of consti-
tutional rights.  It provides in pertinent part that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  Although it provides no substantive rights, the statute “provides a mechanism 
for seeking redress for an alleged deprivation of a litigant’s federal constitutional and federal statutory 
rights by persons acting under color of state law.” KAREN M. BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., SECTION 1983 LITIGATION (1998) available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/sect1983.pdf/$file/sect1983.pdf.  “The constitutional standard for finding state action is 
closely related, if not identical, to the statutory standard for determining ‘color of state law.’”  Ira P. 
Robbins, Privatization of Prisons: An Analysis of the State Action Requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 20 CONN. L. REV. 835, 836 n.2 (1988).  Professor Steven L. Winter 
provides a cogent and brilliant examination of the contours of the metaphor “under color of law,” ex-
ploring the inherent challenges posed by relying on this metaphor “to mediate the application of legal 
restrictions on the exercise of state power.”  Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 331 (1992). 
 12 This article does not address privatization of adoption services which, according to some, 
represents “the most successful and the least controversial component of child-welfare privatization.”  
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mixed public-private identity of ostensibly private providers of child wel-
fare services is long overdue, especially given that privatization’s increas-
ing role in service delivery appears all but unstoppable. 
Specifically, in Part I, I explore aspects of privatization, defining pri-
vatization to include a myriad of public-private partnerships and the whole-
sale privatization of formerly public services.  For purposes of elaboration, 
I discuss the history of privatization in the U.S. prison system, which illu-
strates the danger of minimized constitutional accountability in an era of 
privatization.  In Part II, I provide a brief history of public-private partner-
ships in child welfare.  Part III offers a critique of privatization, exploring 
the traditional justifications offered for increased reliance on the private 
market and the ways in which this altered service delivery may compro-
mise public values as well as civil rights.  This critique is contextualized 
within an understanding of the liability of the state for constitutional viola-
tions under § 1983, which is presented in Parts IV, outlining the contours of 
the Court’s state action jurisprudence, and Part V, examining the accounta-
bility of the state and of private providers for constitutional deprivations 
under § 1983.  In Part VI, I provide a few of the compelling justifications 
for framing harms suffered by children in care as constitutional depriva-
tions over pure torts.  Finally, Part VII presents a recalibration of the tradi-
tional state action test keyed to the new realities of public-private partner-
ships, as well as wholesale privatization in child welfare. 
I.  PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
A.  Defining Privatization 
Privatization is a rather amorphous and ill-defined term, as there are a 
variety of ways in which public-private partnerships have developed and 
expanded to deliver public services.  While most “investigators generally 
acknowledge that public agencies have long purchased services from vo-
luntary social service agencies, most have been impressed by the accele-
rated pace of ‘privatization,’ a term that has replaced the formerly used 
‘public/private partnership.’”13 
B.  Privatization in the Prison System 
Although privatization of formerly public services has been wide-
spread over the last century, I offer one example in which privatization has 
been harshly criticized as advancing too quickly without sufficient accoun-
tability—private prisons. 
 
LISA SNELL, REASON FOUNDATION, POLICY STUDY NO. 271: CHILD-WELFARE REFORM AND THE ROLE 
OF PRIVATIZATION (2000), http://www.reason.org/ps271.html.  Moreover, for the purposes of this ar-
ticle, the scope of privatization includes foster parents.  Many of the same arguments underpinning the 
rationale for holding private non-profit and for-profit agencies liable as state actors apply with equal 
measure to foster parents. 
 13 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 282. 
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Prison overcrowding is often regarded as the primary catalyst for the 
continuing growth of the private prison industry.  For at least the last two 
decades, “private prisons and jails were seen as part of the solution to meet 
the increasing pressure for prison bed space at a time when taxpayers were 
reluctant to pay for correctional services” and did not support divesting re-
sources “from other areas of state responsibilities and services.”14  Al-
though there is a long history of contracting with private entities for medi-
cal, mental health, educational, and food services, in which “the 
correctional agency remains the financier and continues to manage and 
maintain policy control over the type and quality of services provided,” 
more recent prison privatization initiatives have left governments with a 
limited or nonexistent role in the financial support, management, and over-
sight of prisons.15  Rather than a partnership or subcontractor model, 
“[p]rivate companies, some of them publicly traded, now hold contracts to 
operate secure adult facilities and juvenile facilities around the country, and 
in some instances, private companies own the facilities as well as operate 
them.”16 
Corrections, like child welfare, has a rich history of extensive public-
private partnerships,17 but it was not until 1976 that a wholly privately 
owned, high-security institution began operating under contract to the state.  
The Weaversville Intensive Treatment Unit, located in North Hampton, 
Pennsylvania, and designed to handle male juvenile delinquents, “was the 
first modern institution for serious offenders to be completely operated in 
what has become an increasingly lengthy line of [private] institutions in the 
American correctional system.”18  The worldwide growth since then has 
been nothing short of dramatic, with 3100 inmates in privately operated fa-
cilities in 1987 and 132,000 just twelve years later.19  Two corporations, 
Corrections Corporation of America and Wackenhut Corrections Corpora-
tion, account for more than three-quarters of the entire worldwide market.20 
Privately operated prison facilities have often been plagued by prob-
lems associated with the quest for higher earnings.  Indeed, “one of the cen-
tral concerns raised by critics of correctional privatization is that firms mo-
tivated by financial gain might make decisions that enhance profits at the 
expense of the rights and well-being of inmates.”21  In some instances of 
private prison management, “[t]he profit motive produced such abominable 
conditions and exploitation of the inmates that public agencies were forced 
 14 JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, EMERGING ISSUES ON 
PRIVATIZED PRISONS 1–2 (2001) available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf. 
 15 Id. at 2–3. 
 16 MINOW, supra note 1, at 20. 
 17  See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (noting the history of private participation in prisons 
and prison management without challenging the state actor designation of private providers). 
 18 AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 14, at 12 (citations omitted). 
 19 Id. at 3. 
 20 Id. at 3–4. 
 21 Id. at 17. (citations omitted). 
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to assume responsibility.”22  Frighteningly, the current movement towards 
privatization is based on an assumption that “modern entrepreneurs are 
somehow more benevolent and humanistic so that the exploitations of the 
past will not reoccur [sic].”23  Critics disagree, however, and “contend that 
privately managed facilities will bring new opportunities for corruption.”24  
These opponents “question the professionalism and commitment that priva-
tized staff will bring to the job,” given that private prison agencies often 
rely on “poorly paid, undereducated, and inadequately trained staff.”25 
C.  Private Military Forces 
The twin dangers of profit motive and minimal, or nonexistent, over-
sight or accountability have nowhere surfaced in a more controversial 
manner in the last few years than in the context of private military forces—
a polite term for what was once referred to as “mercenaries”—who now 
serve in all areas of war, from construction to security, cooking food to 
conducting interrogations, and almost everything in between.  “Mercena-
ries no more, the successors to the dogs of war . . . now call themselves 
private military companies and focus on [among other things] postwar re-
construction, mine clearance and humanitarian aid.”26  These private mili-
tary firms (PMFs) “trade in professional services intricately linked to” var-
ious critical aspects of warfare—including “tactical combat operations, 
strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, 
troop training, and military technical assistance.”27  Unlike American sol-
diers, sworn to uphold the Constitution and governed by the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, PMFs are private agents, principally motivated by prof-
it.28  Subject neither to the military chain of command nor the restrictions 
of the Geneva Convention, they are, essentially, a law unto themselves, go-
verned only by language in the contracts through which their services are 
retained.29 
Given their broad involvement in many “traditional” aspects of war-
fare, PMFs have not surprisingly been linked to several incidents of abuse 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24  Id.  
 25 Id. 
 26 Jeremy Lovell, Privatized Military Wave of the Future, Firms Say, REUTERS, May 14, 2003 
available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0514-04.htm (last visited August 17, 2006). 
 27 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ra-
mifications for International Security, 26 INT’L SECURITY 186, 186 (2002). 
 28 Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Prob-
lems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1019–20 (2004). 
 29 In 2005, there were approximately 100,000 civilian contractors supporting a range of U.S. ef-
forts, including 20,000 private security forces.  Frontline: Private Warriors (PBS television broadcast 
June 21, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/view/.  Accord-
ing to Peter W. Singer, a private military expert, “[w]hat you’ve done is privatize the fog of war.”  Jay 
Price, Hired Guns Unaccountable, NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 23, 2006, at 1A (detailing the underre-
porting of incidents with private contractors in Iraq that resulted in the death or injury of hundreds of 
Iraqi citizens and the lack of accountability for the conduct of private contractors); see also P.W. 
SINGER,  CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 228 (2003). 
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both in the current war in Iraq and elsewhere abroad.  Notably, what distin-
guishes the atrocities committed by PMFs on civilians throughout the 
world from those occurring at the hands of the U.S. military is that the for-
mer, given the private status of the offenders, typically leave victims with 
no meaningful form of redress.30  This is almost entirely due to the fact that 
although PMFs are equipped to kill, their actions are not governed by long-
standing rules of engagement and since “they aren’t legally considered 
[official] combatants,” there are virtually no rules governing their use of 
force.31 
Responding to these concerns, “[i]n 2000, Congress passed [the Mili-
tary Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act] allowing criminal prosecutions 
against Defense Department (“DOD”) contractors working abroad.”32  The 
drafting of this legislation was prompted in part by “civilian contractors 
with El Segundo-based DynCorp [having] escaped prosecution on accusa-
tions in 2000 of running a prostitution ring in Bosnia.”33  While theoretical-
ly the law allows for prosecution in U.S. courts of contractors working 
alongside the military overseas, it has drawn criticism for being too narrow 
in scope.34  For example, since the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(“MEJA”) covers only American citizens working for American forces, if 
they are “technically” employed by the sovereign host nation, they are ex-
empt, as would be those contracted to work for the United Nations.35  
While some amendments have been made, including an extension of 
MEJA’s jurisdiction to cover employees and contractors of other federal 
agencies in addition to the DOD, the law continues to pose problems in its 
interpretation of what kind of work falls under its scope and who exactly is 
covered—a 21st century iteration of the age old dilemma of defining the 
 30 Peter Singer reports: 
In Colombia, for example, [a PMF] Airscan has been implicated in coordinating the bomb-
ing of a village in which eighteen civilians (including nine children) were killed.  And in 
Peru, employees of [another PMF] Aviation Development Corporation who were working 
on aerial surveillance operations for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency mistakenly di-
rected the shoot[ing] down of a private passenger plane that was later found to be carrying 
a family of missionaries.  An American mother and her seven-month-old daughter were 
killed in the attack. 
Singer, supra note 27, at 218. 
According to media reports, the United States has paid an undisclosed sum to the family of Veronica 
and Charity Bowers, who were killed in the incident, and to the Baptist missionary group they belonged 
to, but stopped short of admitting culpability.  Aviation Development has never publicly accepted re-
sponsibility, and the U.S. government has never publicly accused the company of wrongdoing. 
Robert Capps, Crime without Punishment, SALON.COM, June 27, 2002, http://dir.salon.com/ 
story/news/feature/2002/06/27/military/index.html. 
 31 Ann Scott Tyson, Private Security Workers Living on Edge in Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 
2005, at A1. 
 32 Pratap Chatterjee & A.C. Thompson, Private Contractors and Torture at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, 
CORPWATCH, May 7, 2004, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=10828 (last visited Sept. 14, 
2007). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Capps, supra note 30. 
 35 Id. 
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boundary between what is public and what is private.36  Even with MEJA 
in place, as it now stands, “[t]hanks to a combination of factors—the juris-
dictional conflicts of American law, the immunity provided to these con-
tractors by international treaties, and the underdeveloped police agencies in 
host countries—many crimes committed by private military personnel 
while based overseas will likely go unpunished . . . .”37 
There is a continuing and reasonable fear that unlike state military and 
police forces, private military forces–operating outside of the realm of legal 
accountability, legal constraints, and public oversight—are subject only to 
the market driven law of supply and demand.  History has taught us, how-
ever, that the law of the marketplace has proven to be an ineffective regula-
tor against abuse and a disturbingly impotent arbiter of justice.  While crit-
ics of private military forces—including Gay McDougall, executive 
director of Global Rights, a D.C.-based human rights organization—argue 
that “people who are ‘civilians and often outside of any given chain of 
command should be liable to prosecution for war crimes,’”38 the mechan-
isms by which such accountability would take shape are currently lack-
ing.39  Opponents of this kind of private sector empowerment are, there-
 36 Glenn R. Schmitt, Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Rushing to 
Close an Unforeseen Loophole, ARMY LAW. 43 (June 2005). 
 37 Capps, supra note 30. 
 38 Jonathan Groner, Untested Law Key in Iraqi Abuse Scandal, LEGAL TIMES, May 11, 2004, at 1, 
12. 
 39 At the time of this writing, David Passaro, a CIA contractor who was the first civilian to face 
criminal charges related to U.S. treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq, was found guilty by a 
jury in North Carolina of two charges of assault and assault with a deadly weapon in the death of Abdul 
Wali, an Afghan detainee on a remote U.S. military base.  Andrea Weigl, Jury Finds Passaro Guilty of 
Assault, NEWS & OBSERVER Aug. 17, 2006, http://www.newsobserver.com/497/story/476098.html (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2007).  Ironically, Passaro’s prosecution was not pursuant to provisions of the MEJA, 
but under the U.S. Patriot Act, which prosecutors argued allowed the U.S. government to charge U.S. 
nationals with crimes committed on land or facilities designated for use by the U.S. government.  Estes 
Thompson, Ex-CIA Contractor David Passaro to Stand Trial in Afghan Beating, NEWS & OBSERVER, 
Aug. 5, 2006, http://dwb.newsobserver.com/news/ncwire_news/story/2987127p-9415445c.html (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2007).  In a statement that both suggests growing support for increased accountability 
of private military forces, while also promoting a vague and ambiguous “quasi-state action” test, U.S. 
Attorney General George Holding stated: 
Today, a North Carolina jury sitting in Raleigh delivered a message to the world—nobody 
is above or beneath the law of the United States of America.  The assault took place 8,000 
miles away from here.  The person assaulted was an Afghan farmer.  The person who as-
saulted him was a U.S. citizen working for the CIA as a [private] contractor.  But because 
it was done at a U.S. base with an American flag flying over it, that victim found a little bit 
of justice. 
Weigl, supra (emphasis added).  More recently, a September 16, 2007 shooting episode of 17 civilians 
in Iraq has cast the issue of oversight and accountability of private military forces once more into the 
spotlight.  Blackwater, one of many private contractors in Iraq, supplies guards and training at many 
levels of war.  Mounting frustration over numerous shooting incidents involving Iraqi civilians may 
lead to a shift in the response to private contractors whose conduct up to now has been generally insu-
lated from prosecution by law and policies implemented by U.S. officials.  Most notably, in 2004, the 
United States administration in Iraq wrote a provision into Iraqi law, Order 17, which granted immunity 
to private contractors by exempting them from Iraqi Law.  “Since then, the number of security contrac-
tors has mushroomed and the question of their impunity has grown more pressing.” John M. Broder, 
State Dept. Official Resigns; Oversaw Blackwater and Other Private Guards, NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 25, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/washington/25griffin.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.  As an ex-
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fore, rightfully cautious of the encroachment into inherent governmental 
functions coupled with the diffused responsibility and diminished public 
oversight.  Given the unanswered questions about who monitors, regulates 
and punishes employees of private military forces, and most importantly, 
who holds private military forces accountable for violations of our most 
cherished constitutional or human rights principles, they represent an ex-
treme, but apt, analogy to the unchecked power of private child welfare 
service providers. 
The central tenet running through both of the above broadly defined 
“public services” is that government power vested in the private market, in 
the absence of sufficient accountability and adequate mechanisms of re-
dress, results in more than mere fiscal loss, but human loss.  In examining 
whether harmful conduct arising in the context of these public services is 
deserving of constitutional protection, the question is not  whether history 
reveals any public services to have ever been touched by private forces, but 
rather whether in its current administration, private market providers are 
cloaked in state clothes. 
II.  CONTEMPORARY PRIVATIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CHILD WELFARE 
The history of privatization in child welfare services is a long and va-
ried one.  This article focuses only on the more recent history, since the 
1960s.40  As the federal government began to take a lead in enacting laws 
                                                                                                                                      
ample of the existing lax standard of accountability, the New York Times reported that “[a]fter a drun-
ken employee of Blackwater shot a man to death, . . . the employee was flown out of Iraq, docked pay 
and fired.”  Id.  Many lawmakers and legal scholars are in agreement that the recent shooting highlights 
an urgent need to clarify the law governing private military forces operating in a war zone.  “Workers 
under contract to the Defense Department are subject to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, or 
MEJA, but many, included top State Department officials, contend that the law does not apply to com-
panies like Blackwater that work under contract to other government agencies, including the State De-
partment.”  David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, 
NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater. 
html?pagewanted=1.  As Professor Tyler Cowen aptly observes “[e]xcessive use of private contractors 
erodes checks and balances, and it substitutes market transactions, controlled by the executive branch, 
for traditional political mechani ms of accountability.”  Tyler Cowen, To Know Contractors, Know 
Government, 
s
NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes/com/2007/10/28/business/ 
d a governmental or public nature to it 
when 
28view.html. 
 40 Although beyond the scope of this article, the early history of child welfare service delivery 
demonstrates a mix of public-private partnerships.  There remains, however, a prevailing misperception 
that the earliest forms of child welfare were entirely private philanthropic enterprises with minimal or 
nonexistent governmental involvement.  In detailing the early history of child welfare, some scholars 
have overlooked the import of nascent public-private partnerships that took shape soon after the Revo-
lutionary War, many of which resemble contemporary privatization efforts.  Mangold, for example, 
writes that “[b]efore the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there were no public or private agencies 
dedicated to the care of abused and neglected children.  It was private philanthropic agencies that first 
began this work, intervening into ‘private’ families in the name of protecting vulnerable children.”  Su-
san Vivian Mangold, Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster Care System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1295, 1301–02 (1999).  This is only partially true.  As evidenced in an account of the history of care of 
children in the city of New York, care to neglected children ha
regarded, as it was, as a subset of general aid to the poor. 
The common council [a body of elected city legislators] of [New York] whose minutes dur-
ing the first three-quarters of the century afford many illustrations of aldermanic wisdom as 
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pertaining to child abuse and neglect in the 1960s, state child protective 
agencies were uniformly reformed to meet federal guidelines, to which crit-
ical operating funds were tied.  Concurrently, for the first time states were 
permitted to subcontract with private, nonprofit companies, thus ushering 
in a new variant of public-private child welfare partnerships: 
The first significant growth in the number of public-private arrangements for the 
delivery of child welfare and other social services occurred between 1962 and 
1974, as a result of amendments to the Social Security Act that allowed federal 
funding to be used to fund social services provided by private, nonprofit agen-
cies.41 
A pervasive philosophical shift at the federal level prior to, and partic-
ularly throughout, the Reagan administration prompted movement away 
from “the public commitment at the heart of the Great Society programs of 
the 1960s and [early] 1970s and toward individual and private solutions to 
social problems.”42  No area of social service emerged unscathed, and the 
shift inevitably set the stage for a diminished governmental presence in 
child welfare service delivery.43  Indeed, an ongoing trend in welfare deli-
very since the 1980s has been “the political[affinity] toward privatizing 
many functions the government assumed during the New Deal and Great 
Society eras . . . . includ[ing] privatizing the government’s function of pro-
viding a safety net to preserve the poor families by increasingly using pri-
vate agencies to provide services to children . . . ” 44  Added to this list is 
the increasing emphasis on the provision of services to children by private 
agencies.45 
Most observers would agree that a lingering question is the degree to 
which “more recent trends to ‘privatize’ core child welfare functions” ac-
tually differ “from arrangements that have historically been in place.”46  
Depending on the forms they take, contemporary privatization initiatives 
will vary in the degree to which the public sector retains ownership, finan-
 
f the almshouse for 
per population were seen in 
MENT OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
HIL NGES AND SUCCESSES 13 (2003). 
t 14 (citation omitted). 
mentalist Approach to Protecting En-
& L. 409, 411 (2005). 
/SocialWork/qicpcw/status.htm (last visited on Sept. 14, 2007) [hereinafter 
applied to child-saving, appointed January 7, 1805, a committee to consider and report 
upon the expediency of granting the application of the commissioners o
the establishment at the almshouse of a school for the pauper children. 
FOLKS, supra note 4, at 13.  Moreover, in 1831, legislative action is seen in the form of a committee of 
aldermen reporting on the status of children in the newly formed Bellevue establishment, and a subse-
quent resolution adopted by the assistant aldermen concerning the education and employment of the 
children in the almshouse to “render them less burthensome to themselves . . . .” Id. at 15–16.  Similar 
legislative efforts to partially separate dependent children from the adult pau
the other large cities of Philadelphia, Charleston, and Boston.  Id. at 23–34. 
 41 MADELYN FREUNDLICH & SARAH GERSTENZANG, AN ASSESS
C D WELFARE SERVICES: CHALLE
 42 Id. a
 43 Id. 
 44 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environ
dangered Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y. 
 45 Woodhouse, supra note 6, at 84. 
 46  U. Ky Quality Improvement Ctr. on the Privatization of Child Welfare Servs., Status of Priva-
tization, http://www.uky.edu
Quality Improvement Ctr.]. 
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and Florida.54  Such initiatives, which represent the most dramatic evidence 
                                       
cial responsibility, and accountability.47  “Specifically with regard to con-
tracting out—the model most frequently used in the social services, in gen-
eral, and in child welfare services in particular—government is likely to 
continue to finance services while private entities actually provide them.”48  
Contracting out has historically been used to provide foster care services, 
as “public family law allowed philanthropic [private] providers to receive 
public funds and work cooperatively with public agencies to provide 
placement services.”49  A central feature of contemporary public-private 
contracting seems to be the extent to which the public agency “has trans-
ferred responsibility for day-to-day case management within the particular 
program to the private provider, and who maintains decision-making au-
thority at critical junctures as the case progresses.”50  In contemporary pub-
lic-private agreements, private provider agencies participate by delivering 
services to families voluntarily and by court order.  However, unless they 
are involved in an “ongoing way with a family when new allegations arise, 
[private providers] do not usually participate in the front end or ‘rescue’ 
aspect of cases,”51 as they once had and, instead, enter at the point of dis-
position, delivering services that ar
ly and/or ordered by the court. 
A second period of growth in private service participation occurred in 
the mid-1990s with amendments to the Social Security Act, which widened 
the channel of participation for private child welfare agencies.  The Person-
al Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 also 
ushered several amendments that permitted states to make Title IV-E foster 
care maintenance payments to for-profit and nonprofit private child care 
institutions.52  Under then existing law, IV-E foster care payments were li-
mited to nonprofit private or public child care institutions.  Experiments 
with privatization have not stopped with mere contracting of certain servic-
es or a percentage of child welfare cases and have come to include the pri-
vatization of entire state systems in a number of states, including, Kansas53 
                   
pra note 41, at 15 (citing P. Starr, The Meaning of Privatiza-
on, 
and Rehab. 
 47 FREUNDLICH & GERSTENZANG, su
ti 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6 (1988)). 
 48 Id. at 3. 
 49 Mangold, supra note 40, at 1309. 
 50 Quality Improvement Ctr., supra note 46. 
 51 Mangold, supra note 40, at 1313. 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 672(b)(1)–(2) (2000). 
 53 “In 1996–97, Kansas became the first state in the nation to fully privatize its adoption, foster 
care, and family preservation services.”  Privatization.org, Child Welfare Services, 
http://www.privatization.org/database/policyissues/childwelfare_state.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).  
With that, “Kansas’s Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS), previously the state’s 
largest provider of adoption and foster care services, [became] strictly a purchaser of services and con-
tract monitor with respect to child welfare services.”  Id.  See also Kansas Dept. of Social 
Serv., Foster Care/Reintegration Services, http://www.srskansas.org/services/fostercare.htm (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2007) (noting that “[on] March 1, 1997, private contract agencies [in Kansas] assumed respon-
sibility for foster care services including case planning, placement [and] service delivery.”). 
 54 Although current versions of the Florida statute, as amended by FLA. STAT. § 409.1671 (2001), 
replaced the term “privatization” with “outsourcing,” earlier versions of the bill made clear the intent to 
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of the rush toward privatization, have been marked by the dismantling of 
public systems of child welfare on a statewide level and largely disappoint-
ing results for beneficiaries. 
III.  DEBATE AND CRITIQUE 
A.  The Pros and Cons of Privatization 
To better understand the debate over privatized child welfare service 
delivery, one must embed it within a broader discussion of privatized hu-
man services.  An overly simplified assessment of this debate would read 
as follows: political conservatives, haunted by the specter of big govern-
ment and the suppression of free market economics, favor increased diver-
sion of government funds and authority to private for-profit and nonprofit 
entities.  Our reliance on private support mechanisms for public purposes 
reflects a long-held belief that we as a nation have long expressed our “re-
ligious and moral conviction of responsibility for our fellow man” through 
our private social agencies.55 
The “marketplace allure” argument is rooted in an unwavering admi-
ration for a free market, competitive, economic system—one that views the 
delivery of public benefits as analogous to the production, sale, and con-
sumption of commodities.  This appeal is amplified by the presumed effi-
ciency and cost savings.  Indeed, the rush toward privatization is driven in 
part by dissatisfaction with the quality of public services and the perception 
that privatization will improve the situation.  Even without consistent data 
to support the assertion, many are guided by the “belief that the market-
place and competition will discipline organizations that provide low-quality 
goods or services by driving them out of business . . . .”56 
Free markets are themselves defined by the ability to engage in com-
petitive exchanges of goods and services.  Indeed, traditional “[e]conomic 
theory [would] suggest that social welfare rises as the level of competition 
 
privatize Florida’s entire state child welfare system. See 57 FLA. JUR. 2D WELFARE § 114 (outlining 
public expenditures to perform . . . traditional functions [pertaining 
] ch
nst the more nebulous ones around which 
uma
Florida’s plan for privatization of foster care services by 2003).  See also Johnson, supra note 1, at 10 
(noting that “[i]n 1998, Florida passed legislation facilitating a major reorganization of the Department 
of Children and Families (DCF) and mandating that foster children be placed in private care by 2003.”). 
 55 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 291 (quoting then Executive Director of the Child Welfare League 
of America, Joseph Reid).  Reid’s testimony before Congress was reflective of his broader policy work 
in promoting progressive child welfare practices and his call for “an expanded child welfare network 
that would require ever-increasing 
to ild neglect and abuse, arranging for and supervising foster placement and adoption, and providing 
institutional care.”  Id. at  288–91. 
 56 PAMELA WINSTON ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH INC., PRIVATIZATION OF 
WELFARE SERVICES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 16 (2002), available at http://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/PDFs/privatization.pdf.  Not surprisingly, the absence of data might be attributable to our gen-
eral distaste for the unappealing metrics involved in any cost-benefit analysis.  Such a calculation would 
inevitably require weighing purely economic measures agai
h n service delivery have long been oriented.  In the case of child welfare, they include, among oth-
ers, child well-being, family preservation, and permanency. 
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ls of the private and the individual, as con-
traste
f actual or hypothetical 
gains
increases.”57  However, in practice, while many public services can ac-
commodate competition, or even flourish under it, others are unable to so 
seamlessly adapt to competitive market forces.  In a marked departure from 
this key feature of economic free market theory, competition has been noti-
ceably absent from many child welfare privatization initiatives. In fact, cer-
tain models of c
 drawn criticism for the “undesired and unnecessary monopolies” they 
have created.58 
In addition to the relatively objective rationales noted above, explana-
tions for “[t]he acceleration of service contracting” of the more subjective 
ilk has included “ideological preferences for privately delivered services”; 
the perception of “greater professionalism” [in] private sector agencies; the 
presumption that privately provided services are more carefully “attuned to 
the needs of clients and communities”; and, finally, that such services are 
less stigmatized than are those delivered directly by public entities.59  As 
Professor Martha Fineman observes, we “have an historic and highly ro-
manticized affair with the idea
d with the public and the collective, as the appropriate units of focus 
in determining social good.”60 
An embrace of the private over public, however, is not universal.  Po-
litical liberals, espousing many of the ideals of Progressive Era reformists, 
continue to “see volunteerism and civil society [as] harmed by the excesses 
of the market”61 and view public participation in the provision of social 
services as a critical dimension and responsibility of government.  They 
caution against a “market methodology” with its tendency toward “evaluat-
ing human actions and social outcomes in terms o
 from trade measured in money” and the universal market rhetoric that 
increasingly influences the social service sector.62 
The National Association of Child Advocates, for example, takes issue 
with social service privatization due to the limited number of participants, 
noting that “[t]here tend to be only a few buyers and sellers, as opposed to 
                                                          
 57 Erwin Blackstone & Simon Hakim, A Market Alternative to Child Adoption and Foster Care, 
2 C  492 (2003) available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22n3/cj22n3-6.pdf. 
 
he state’s child welfare system but are compensated with a per-child, 
, THE KANSAS CHILD 
ELF RE SHOULD WE BE GOING? (2001)). 
ONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY, at xiv (2004). 
2 ATO J. 485,
58 Id. 
In 1996, Kansas drew national attention by adopting a managed-care system for its child 
welfare program statewide. Under this system, private-sector organizations were paid a set 
fee for each child referred, intended to cover the cost of all foster care, family preservation, 
or adoption services provided.  However, the state’s Department of Social and Rehabilita-
tive Services recently terminated the managed care approach after discovering that it 
created significant financial difficulties for contractors. Private providers continue to play 
an important role in t
per-month payment. 
WINSTON ET AL., supra note 56, at 9 (citing, KANSAS ACTION FOR CHILDREN
W ARE SYSTEM: WHERE ARE WE? WHE
 59 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 282. 
 60 MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUT
 61 MINOW, supra note 1, at 27. 
 62 Radin, supra note 6, at 1861. 
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the many buyers and sellers typically needed to support [genuine] competi-
tion.  The buyer in huma
sellers of human services often hold a virtual monopoly.”63 
As Judge Jean Shepherd, a juvenile court judge for the Seventh D
 in Kansas, noted,64 
Privatization, . . . has led not to the healthy free competition one might expect, 
[but] instead . . . has created enormous service monopolies in this state.  Before 
privatization we had four or five family preservation choices in our county . . . . 
[W]e no longer have the choices that we had before. . . . [I]n the past if we had 
questions as to abuse or neglect or quality of services in one placement or with 
one provider, we would attempt not to send our children to that entity until prob-
lems were resolved . . . . Our provider [today] operates the only show in town.65 
Despite the professed fiscal gains on which many privatization initia-
tives are based, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence that privatiza-
tion of human services, and child welfare services in particular, saves dol-
lars or meets any of the stated public aims of the program.  “While a 
number of surveys have colle
ts’ use of privatization, few focus specifically on social services,” 
 where its use is, arguably, most complicated.66  According to a po
rt of the Urban Institute: 
The little empirical analysis comparing the effectiveness of public versus 
service delivery shows no clear evidence that private service delivery is inherent-
ly more effective or less effective than public service delivery, although the pub-
lic, private, and non-profit sectors each have their own relative strengths and 
weaknesses.  There are examples of success and failure in both sectors.67 
There is a disturbing underlying contextual factor that lends further 
support to the arguments raised by privatization opponents—that of agen-
cy.  The absence of agency for direct recipients of social services poses a 
particular risk of harm when less altruistic and charitable aims (i.e., profit) 
might influence agency decision making and drive the behavior of partici-
pants.  Recipients of social services may have a limited capacity for choice 
and are typically not the actual decision makers.  Young children, for ex-
ample, are unable to make serious decisions.  Instead, the person making 
critical decisions is likely to be someone other than the recipient—often the 
third-party beneficiary of a public-private partnership contract.  Of course, 
 63 FREUNDLICH & GERSTENZANG, supra note 41, at 7 (citing NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHILD 
ADVOCATES. FACT SHEET: PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SERVICES—IS IT THE BEST CHOICE FOR 
CHILDREN? (2000)). 
 64 The SRS Transition Oversight Committee before whom Judge Shephard testified was con-
vened to review a number of programs undertaken by the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilita-
tive Services, including the agency’s privatization of adoption, family preservation and foster care pro-
grams.  Roger Myers, Judge Questions Program Benefits, TOPEKA CAP. J., Nov. 5, 1997, at 1-A. 
 65 Luke Andrew & Steven Demaree, “Tiny Little Shoes”: The Privatization of Child Welfare Ser-
vices in Kansas, 69 UMKC L. REV. 643, 646–47 (2001). 
 66 WINSTON ET AL., supra note 56, at 7. 
 67 DEMETRA SMITH NIGHTINGALE & NANCY M. PINDUS, PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: A 
BACKGROUND PAPER (1997) http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=407023. 
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although the decision maker may have the best interests of the recipient in 
mind, it cannot be merely assumed that the best interests of the recipient 
will always win out, especially when the decision maker is under pressures 
wholly distinct from traditional social service aims.  It is reasonable, there-
fore, to imagine instances in which the private 
uce optimal outcomes for the recipient.”68  Indeed, “the more vulnera-
ble the client and the more involuntary the client’s participation (e.g., hos-
pitals, prisons, child welfare), the higher the risk” that diminished recipient 
agency will operate to their detriment.69 
Particularly worrisome is the manner in which agency and accounta-
bility interact to the detriment of recipients.  The lack of direct recipient 
agency has implications for the ability of states to hold private providers 
accountable for any wrongdoing, as “[n]either voter nor consumer sove-
reignty [which are the most typically reliant strategies] can secure accoun-
tability when public and private realms merge.”70  As Professor Minow 
comments with respect to illusory market-style consumer choice, the as-
sumption that consumers will “vote with their feet”—as private markets in-
herently assume—is so unlikely that meaningful accountability simply 
cannot be guaranteed.71
services—performance-based contracting—may appea
service recipients into account, the degree and manne
stically influences actual service delivery is in no way the functional 
equivalent of agency.72 
B.  Diminished Accountability in the Eyes of the Law 
In addition, far less is known about the intangible costs and risks of 
privatization, some of which are fairly elusive and difficult to quantify in a 
straightforward cost-benefit analysis.  Among the most troubling of these 
risks is that of diminished accountability, which in turn poses a greater risk 
of harm in the event that private providers fail to meet acceptable standards 
of service delivery.  This diminished accountability is due largely to the li-
mited remedial scheme that governs conduct between ostensibly private ac-
tors.  It poses a particular risk in the context of human service delivery, 
where the inherently discretionary dimension places human service reci-
 68 Rebecca M. Blank, When Can Public Policy Makers Rely on Private Markets?: The Effective 
Provision of Social Services, 110 ECON. J. C34, C37 (2000).  This issue is particularly problematic in 
the context of private prisons, as some opponents claim it is inappropriate to operate prisons based on a 
profit motive.  “In many instances, private prison operators are paid according to the number of inmates 
housed.  Arguably, it is in the operator’s financial interests to encourage lengthier sentences for inmates 
[or lobby to amend criminal law so that more offenses are punishable with incarceration] to keep bed 
spaces filled.”  AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 14, at 16.  Moreover, “[c]ritics of prison privatization 
argue that firms will cut corners, from construction materials to hiring inexperienced personnel, forsak-
ing security and quality of service in the process of making a profit.”  Id. 
 69 NIGHTINGALE & PINDUS, supra note 67. 
 70 MINOW, supra note 1, at 29. 
 71 Id. at 34. 
 72 This query itself raises a critical question about whether constitutional rights ought to hinge on 
the drafting of contracts. 
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ivatize than [any] other government 
func
realit[ies].”77  As Professor Sheila Kennedy notes, “[t]here is significant 
        
pients at greater risk than beneficiaries of other traditionally public or go-
vernmental services.  For this reason, “[i]t has been generally assumed that 
social services are more difficult to pr
tion[,] because defining and measuring performance [and, therefore, 
ensuring accountability] is more challenging.”73  As Johnson so aptly 
stated, “[p]icking up garbage is easier to oversee and monitor than ensuring 
foster children are properly placed.”74 
Despite these acknowledged risks, especially in child welfare, “there 
is scant public debate about whether [public-private partnerships] jeopard-
ize public commitments to equality, due process, [civil rights,] and democ-
racy.”75  For all the potential benefits that may accrue to privatization, the 
delegation of authority and responsibility from public to private providers 
remains problematic, particularly when the civil rights of recipients are cur-
tailed by virtue of the ostensibly private garb in which service delivery is 
cloaked.  Indeed, too little attention is focused on the impact of privatiza-
tion on the diminished constitutional protections for service recipients.76  
Although recently, the growth “in privatization of government programs 
mean[s] that the constitutional paradigm of a sharp separation between 
public and private is increasingly at odds with the blurred public-private 
character of modern governance . . . . [L]ittle effort has been made to ad-
dress th[e] disconnect between constitutional law and new administrative 
                                                  
 
child protective activities) from private agencies, other values than efficiency are 
ance on pri-
milies within the child welfare system.  Id. at 16. 
 73 Johnson, supra note 1, at 10. 
74 Id.  Kennedy also notes that: 
[E]ntrusting the most vulnerable citizens and the most delicate service tasks to private 
agencies is not simply a matter of choice between “making” or “buying” services.  This 
might be the case when one considers contracting out for pencils, computer services, or 
strategic weapons.  But when it comes to purchasing the care and control of drug addicts, 
the safety and nurturing of children, the relief of hunger and the regulation of family life 
(through 
at stake. 
Kennedy, supra note 10, at 206.  Not surprisingly, the debate is far more nuanced than such a simplistic 
assessment could ever capture, and the subtleties beyond the more narrow focus of this article.  Propo-
nents of increased privatization wrap their support around a free market driven philosophy whose pur-
ported strengths include “efficiency, self-determination, consumer choice and cost effectiveness within 
an enterprise culture.”  FREUNDLICH & GERSTENZANG, supra note 41, at 1 (quoting C. Sampson, The 
Three Faces of Privatization, 28 J. BRIT. SOC. ASS’N 79–90).  At its core, “one of the most powerful 
[causal] factors [to which increased public-private partnerships can be attributed] may be ‘the persis-
tence of value-laden preferences for private solutions to public problems in the American context.’”  Id. 
(quoting Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 292).  One might indeed be correct in concluding that, based on the 
widespread and increasing private market participation in social service delivery, there is no human 
service that could be better delivered through governmental rather than private channels.  Moreover, in 
an era of tightening state budgets and ballooning government deficits, reliance on the private market is 
only likely to increase.  Opponents of privatization, specifically in the area of child welfare, temper 
their enthusiasm for a free-market driven system by highlighting the dearth of empirical evidence that 
would definitively establish substantive benefits to the public, particularly as they concern efficiency 
and quality of services through competition.  Id. at 5.  Moreover, they express concerns that the out-
comes associated with increased privatization do not outweigh the concerns about how reli
vatized mechanisms effect children and fa
 75 MINOW, supra note 1, at 2. 
 76 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 461. 
 77 Metzger, supra note 9, at 1367. 
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evidence that the growth of government contracting, coupled with an un-
realistic and narrow understanding of state action, has created a jurispru-
dence that . . . is significantly underprotective of constitutional rights.”78  
Opposition to privatization in the legal community is based on an underly-
ing pre
ic and that which is private, and this difference is to be found in law, 
not economic functions or other market-oriented justifications for privatiza-
tion.79 
Even if distinctions between public and private child welfare service 
agencies have little measurable impact on actual service delivery, they 
emerge as paramount to the context and scope of rights granted to service 
recipients when they seek redress for harm inflicted by a private, rather 
than a public, provider.  Because “[t]he requirement of state action is a ne-
cessary prerequisite to most civil rights actions . . . . the state action inquiry 
serves as a threshold in the protection of individual civil liberties.”80  Ac-
cordingly, the question to ask is, “[i]f we are altering traditional definitions 
of public and private by virtue of these new relationships, what is the effect 
of that alteration on a constitutional system that depends upon the distinc-
tion as a fundamental safeguard of private rights?”81  In an aptly cautionary 
tone, it is observed that “[b]ecause private institutions generally are not 
subject to constitutional restraints . . . debate over the merits of . . . [privati-
zation] must be informed by a real understanding of the different legal po-
sitions of the public and private sectors.”82  Of course, the degree of “pub-
licness” versus “privateness”83 of the agency delivering services, therefore, 
matters insofar as “[r]ights secured by the U.S. Constitution are in every 
instance . . . protected from only government [public, and not private,] in-
fringement.”84  When
ering the service provider a state actor, a panoply of rights is made 
available that is simply nonexistent when the provider is regarded as a 
 78 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 204. 
 79 Ronald C. Moe, Exploring the Limits of Privatization, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 453, 454 (Nov.–
Dec. 1987).  It is for this reason that in 1986 the American Bar Association issued a resolution caution-
ing that the privatization of prisons and jails should not proceed “until the complex constitutional, statu-
tory, and contractual issues are satisfactorily developed and resolved.”  Id. at 457.  This opposition is 
applicable with arguably equal force to the privatization of child welfare as it is to the privatization of 
prisons and jails, and has compelled some in the legal profession to oppose privatization largely on con-
stitutional and statutory grounds. 
 80 David E. Lust, What to do When Faced with a Novel State Action Question? Punt: The Eighth 
Circuit’s Decision in Reinhart v. City of Brookings, 42 S.D. L. REV. 508, 508 (1997). 
 81 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 206. 
 82 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 461. 
 83 I borrow the terms “publicness” and “privateness” from Prof. Ruth Hardie Shane, whose work 
focuses on the implications for public administrators of legal and constitutional distinctions of public-
ness and privateness in the delivery of public services and the import of this distinction in the Supreme 
Court’s state action jurisprudence.  Ruth Hardie Shane, Private Actions—Public Responsibilities: Ref-
lections on West v. Atkins (1988) (Nov. 19 2003) (unpublished dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Insti-
tute) (quoting Interview with Gary Wamsley Professor, Center for Public Administration and Policy, 
Virginia Tech, in Blacksburg Virginia) (addressing the legal and constitutional distinctions between 
publicness and privateness and the implications of that distinction for public administrators). 
 84 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 461. 
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purely private entity. 
Under the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the state action 
doctrine and the varied corollary interpretations espoused by lower courts, 
lingering questions remain about which precise constellation of factors fa-
vors identifying public-private partnerships as purely private entities or as 
sufficiently aligned with the state as to have assumed its identity.85  Espe-
cially as the state action doctrine is applied in the context of private child 
welfare service delivery, the lines between public and private easily blur, 
for as Professor Martha Minow notes, “The lines themselves are historical 
inventions.”86  Unfortunately, the accelerated pace toward privatization is 
occurring in the absence of necessary clarity regarding where the lines are, 
or should be, drawn.  Although “[n]ew forms of governm ne tal activities, 
developing within the growing scope of . . . privatization [have changed] 
the reality of state actions,”87 the content of the legal doctrine of state ac-
tion has not changed and ceases to serve its professed aims.88 
There remains, in each case, a feature unique to child welfare, with the 
exception of prisons—the overarching coercive presence of the state at the 
very core of the child welfare system.  It is perhaps so self-evident as to be 
taken for granted, but the fact that children may only be legally removed 
and formally placed in the child welfare system through a court order rend-
ers this conduct arguably the least ambiguous form of state action.  Its exis-
tence is itself grounded in the notion of the state as parens patriae, with 
state law serving as “the very foundation for what [a child welfare] agency 
is supposed to, or able to, do.”89  Indeed, it is the specter of the omnipotent 
state that provides a gloss of authority through which private agencies are 
empowered to do great good, and potentially great harm.  Not only does the 
state enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, it also possesses the 
unique authority to break apart one of the most fundamental units of socie-
ty: the family.90  When, where, and how aspects of this awesome authority 
are delegated to private providers is the subject of continued debate.  What 
is largely absent from the debate, however, is a full assessment of the con-
sequences of extending the authority
 85 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 18-1, at 1690 (2d ed. 1988) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has not succeeded in developing a body of state action ‘doctrine,’ a set of rules for de-
termining whether governmental or private actors are to be deemed responsible for an asserted constitu-
tional violation.”). 
 86 MINOW, supra note 1, at 22. 
 87 Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
1169, 1191 (1995). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Shane, supra note 83, at 10 (citations omitted). 
 90 Daniel Bergner, The Case of Marie and Her Sons, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, (Magazine), at 
28.  Bergner’s article “tells the story of a mother who wants to raise her five sons despite her struggles 
with drugs and violent men—and of the child-welfare worker who must decide whether to take away 
those children for good.”  Id. at 3.  In describing the awesome responsibility which her job entails and 
explaining how it might contribute to the constant and quick turnover of her colleagues, the child-
welfare worker offered the following: “It’s almost hard to comprehend that we have [the prerogative to 
enter a family’s home and split it apart] . . . .  It’s so huge.”  Id. at 31. 
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ally not constrained in the same manner as traditional state actors from un-
constitutional conduct, and the corresponding need to tread more cautiously 
down the path toward privatization. 
Contracts and monitoring are conceivably one source of accountability 
and protection.  However, contract provisions provide only marginal and 
risky guarantees of accountability.  Moreover, although comprehensive 
contracts might offer sufficient guarantees of service provision, what of ac-
countability for constitutional deprivations that arise in the context of ser-
vice delivery?  Most would find it unacceptable that constitutional guaran-
tees might rest on the details outlined in a contract, especially one to which 
the direct recipient, and potential victim of harm, is not even a party. 
Contract monitors may serve a useful watchdog function; however, 
their role is limited to the terms of the contract itself.  The City of Philadel-
phia Department of Human Services, a municipality that spends nearly 
82% of its budget on contracted private services,91 defines the purpose of 
contract monitoring (the Division of Contract Administration and Program 
Evaluation) to include the translation of “the Department’s goals and objec-
tives into service provision contracts”; centralization of “the process of 
evaluating what works”; and assurance that “all contracts contain perfor-
mance standards that monitor achievement.”92  Although the aims may be 
laudable, they have not insulated the department from controversy stem-
ming from private agency conduct.93  Indeed, effective contract monitoring 
is quite often stymied by the “‘short supply’ of usable management infor-
mation systems, auditing capability, and skilled contract managers,”94 all of 
whose scarcity undermines meaningful accountability in the context of pri-
vatized social services.95  Ideally, beyond merely contracting with private 
entities, state and local governments must assess their “capacity in terms of 
both resources and expertise, to appropriately design, implement, and over-
                                                          
 91 City of Phila. Dep’t. of Human Servs., Contract Administration Home Page,  
ila.gov/intranet/pgintrahome_pub.nsf/content/contractadminhomepage [hereinafter DHS 
om
ract with 
R, Dec. 10, 2006, at A1. 
UNDLICH & GERSTENZANG, supra note 41, at 9 (quoting H.B. Milward, Nonprofit Con-
act the Hollow State, 54 PUB ADMIN. REV. 73, 78 (1994)). 
http://dhs.ph
H epage] (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). 
 92 Id. 
 93 The Philadelphia Department of Human Services has been the object of much scrutiny follow-
ing 50 child deaths that have occurred since 2000 and a recent multi-million settlement in a civil rights 
claim against the agency.  In November 2006, Philadelphia Mayor John Street appointed a Child Wel-
fare Review Panel, consisting of child welfare experts from across the state and country to examine, 
among other issues, how the Department of Human Services hires and evaluates private contractors.  
John Sullivan, City DHS Panel Looks at Hiring of Contractors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 20, 2006, at B1.  
Cited as an example of egregious contract monitor failing is the case of a private child welfare agency, 
MultiEthnic Behavioral Health, Inc. which “won city contracts to watch over children at risk of abuse 
and neglect.”  Nancy Phillips and Craig R. McCoy, DHS Gave Psychologist a Contract Despite Per-
sonal, Career Problems, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 10, 2006, at A1.  Although the private agency’s direc-
tor lost his state certification due to an assault conviction, he was awarded a $3.5 million cont
DHS until the death of a 14-year old client under the care of the private contractor.  Nancy Phillips and 
Craig R. McCoy, Mounting Failures Left Girl to Die, PHILA. INQUIRE
 94 FRE
tr ing and 
 95 Id. 
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cipients are by and large101 not independent actors volitionally 
contr
see priv
it that, “[i]n the end, contract monitors simply make sure that the w
ised will be delivered,” and nothing more.97  For these reasons 
e: 
Critics are . . . [rightfully] skeptical about the actual degree of accountability that 
exists when social services are privatized. . . .  Even when there are adequate sys-
tems to ensure accountability, the question often is “[a]ccountability for what 
outcomes?”  Although the expectat oni  is that private contractors will be held ac-
countable for results, Bardach and Lesser argued that, at most, accountability is 
“for a better quality of effort directed toward the results being measured” as op-
posed to higher quality outcomes.”98 
In light of the implicit challenges to developing adequate accountabili-
ty mechanisms, contract compliance alone may ring hollow as an adequate 
gauge.  One of the challenges might be the elusive definition of the term 
accountability itself, which can be understood to encompass a broader 
scope than the mere performance standards outlined in contract terms.  Ac-
countability in this sense reflects the democratic accountability within a 
constitutional system in which elected persons in power are held accounta-
ble to the voting public.  This is accomplished by levying an obligation that 
the party accountable report performance outcomes and be subject to sanc-
tions.  Neither of these markers is meaningful, however, unless the relevant 
parties base their actions on information about the actual performance of 
elected persons, governments, private enterprises, or other activities.99  In a 
business context, “[c]onsumers and investors have power to hold others ac-
countable because they can vote with their feet, but they cannot exercise 
this power if they do not know how or even whether to judge.” 100  Child 
welfare service recipients, unlike traditional consumer or investors, are 
generally powerless to exert any direct influence over the private agency.  
Service re
acting for services, but individuals compelled by force of law to en-
gage with private providers who are sometimes the proverbial “only game 
in town.” 
As previously noted, the lack of service recipient agency looms even 
larger when this view of accountability is assessed, given that service reci-
pients are increasingly restrained in their exercise of democratic powers as 
private systems of care eclipse public ones.  Service recipients might then 
                                                          
 96 Id. 
 97 CONNA CRAIG ET AL., REASON FOUND, POLICY STUDY NO. 248: BLUEPRINT FOR THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE 13 (1998). 
 98 FREUNDLICH & GERSTENZANG, supra note 41, at 9 (quoting E. Bardach & C. Lesser, Accoun-
tability in Human Services Collaboratives: For What? And to Whom?, 6 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH 
& THEORY 197, 201 (1996)). 
 99 MINOW, supra note 1, at 153 
 100 Id. 
 101 Note that the focus of this article is children who are in the legal custody of the state and whose 
families are compelled by the state to engage in private child welfare service delivery.  I am not ad-
dressing the circumstance of families referred on a voluntary basis for services. 
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ma-
since “[c]itizens [may] vote 
 . . cannot pursue these ac-
tions
application and nonapplication of the Constitution.”110  Application of con-
tit providers of public services would be assured 
e Co
be said to at best enjoy only an attenuated measure of oversight, which can 
be exerted through pressure on the elected representatives who appoint key 
public officials, who in turn contract with private providers.  In this chain 
of effects, it is indisputable that because “the use of private firms places 
‘the influence over, and sometimes even control of, important decisions 
one step further away from the public and their elected representatives,’”102 
service recipients are left with a diminished capacity to hold private firms 
directly accountable.103  Moreover, even this minimal influence, moreover, 
is wholly dependent on the ability to access information regarding private 
providers and the contracts into which they enter.  Access to such infor
tion is a critical component of accountability, 
with ballots, petitions, and speeches, but they .
 meaningfully if they do not know what is going on.”104 Unlike the 
voting public, service recipients do not have access to private agency per-
formance in a manner which would permit them meaningful review.105 
C.  Civil Rights and Constitutional Protections 
Although “[t]he concern over accountability of private actors perform-
ing public functions is a ripe debate in administrative law and in other subs-
tantive law areas,”106 it is nowhere more important than in the constitution-
al rights of public service recipients.107  At the heart of the American 
system of constitutional accountability is “the distinction between govern-
ment and other realms,” which matters insofar as context “trigger[s]. . . 
constitutional protections guaranteeing due process and equal protec-
tion.”108  Commitments to, for example, due process and equal protection 
operate only as a constitutional matter when the state, and not a private par-
ty, acts.109  “The notoriously tricky question is how exactly to draw the line 
between state and private action, which polices the boundary between the 
s utional duties to private 
w re the nstitution to give direct horizontal effect to such protections; 
however, such is not the traditional leaning of our constitutional jurispru-
                                                          
 102 Singer, supra note 27, at 218. 
 103 Id. 
 104 MINOW, supra note 1, at 153. 
 105 Kelsi Brown Cokran describes this dynamic as a type of “information symmetry” in foster care 
contracting in which “the individualized nature of service goals and the absence of meaningful perfor-
mances measures make it very difficult for the government as principal to determine the quality of fos-
r c i.e., the nonprofit agencies with which it contracts.” Kelsi 
ro an, oster Care Contracting, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 29, 30 
00 e foster care contracting, the purchaser of the ser-
our sdic-
ffect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 
412 (2
te are services provided by its agents—
B wn Cokr Principal-Agent Obstacles to F
(2 6).  When, as in the case of private child welfar
vice (the government) is different from the consumer (the parent and child under the c t’s juri
tion), “the market institutions that address quality uncertainty work far less effectively.”  Id. at 34. 
 106 Mangold, supra note 40, at 1318. 
 107 Id. 
 108 MINOW, supra note 1, at 31. 
 109 Sullivan, supra note 8, at 461. 
 110 Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal E
003). 
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IV.  A CLASH OF REA  ACTION DOCTRINE 
 21ST CENTURY 
A.  T
dence.111  The constitutional regulation of third party, nominally “private,” 
conduct is referred to as the “third party effect.”112  Only were this doctrine 
the norm would enforcement of constitutional rights easily apply to priva
es and individuals with equal force as enforcement against the state. 
The ability to hold private providers of public services accountable for 
constitutional deprivations rests on the outcome of this search, for it re-
mains unclear as a normative matter the extent to which private agencies 
providing public services should or do have any constitutional duty to the 
clients they serve.  As Professor Sullivan warns “privatization may under-
mine constitutional protections, because private entities, unlike public 
agencies, are not politically accountable nor are they bound by principles 
regarding the protection of citizens’ rights.”113  He concludes, in the end, 
that “privatization and protection of civil liberties
rights] may prove to be mutually exclusive goals.”  
LITIES: THE TRADITIONAL STATE
CONFRONTS THE
raditional State Action Doctrine 
Because constitutional limitations and checks on constitutional ac-
countability do not generally apply to acts of private parties, the basic 
query that courts aim to resolve in the context of state action claims is 
whether the private conduct complained of may fairly be attributed to the 
state.  To say that determining which conduct is public and which private 
has been fraught with controversy and confusion is a considerable unders-
tatement.  Although “[t]he Supreme Court has established a number of ap-
proaches to this general question, which it has recently said are essentially 
‘facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution,’”115 the weight 
attached to certain facts and the manner in which they bear on the fairness 
                                                          
 111 Stephen Gardbaum, Where the (State) Action is, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 760, 773 (2006). Gard-
baum reviews a spectrum of conceptualizations of horizontal application of constitutional rights, which 
includes no horizontal effect, weak and strong indirect horizontality, and direct horizontality.  Id. at 
762–67.  As Professor Gardbaum summarizes: 
er; and (3) direct effect, because constitutional 
 do bind the actions of private actors. 
. a
t, in THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE 
EL
 41, at 10 (citing Sullivan, supra note 8, at 461–67). 
. 2002) (quoting Brentwood 
econdary Sch. Athletic Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)). 
[T]here are three very general positions a constitutional system can take regarding the ef-
fect of constitutional rights on private actors . . . . These are: (1) no effect at all, direct or 
indirect, because constitutional rights only govern public law—regulating the relations be-
tween the individual and the state; (2) indirect effect, because although private actors are 
not bound by constitutional rights, such rights govern the laws that private actors invoke 
and rely on in their relations with each oth
rights
Id t 778. 
 112 Mark Tushnet, The Relationship Between Judicial Review of Legislation and the Interpretation 
of Non-Constitutional Law, with Reference to Third Party Effec
R ATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 167, 167 (2005). 
 113 FREUNDLICH & GERSTENZANG, supra note
 114 Id. (citing Sullivan, supra note 8, at 466). 
 115 Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t. Inc., 289 F.3d 231, 239 (3d Cir
Acad. v. Tenn. S
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 a syste-
mati
 “nexus” test, examining 
the d
y the private person or entity”123 
and i
its apex in the 1968 case of Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan 
of the attribution is a process better approximating divination than
c application of any clear rule of law.116  In the end, state action attri-
bution has been far easier articulated in theory than realized in practice, as 
the Court “has applied [the view that private actions should be construed as 
those of the State] very narrowly, considering most actions as private de-
spite clear traces of government involvement.”117 
In lieu of establishing one uniform standard for determining state ac-
tion, lower courts, guided by Supreme Court jurisprudence, have cited a va-
rying range of factors and tests.118  Among the traditional approaches that 
assess whether the state requires, encourages, or is otherwise significantly 
involved in nominally private conduct are (1) the “compulsion” test, ex-
ploring the manner in which the state has exercised any affirmative conduct 
compelling the conduct complained of,119 (2) the
egree of state involvement in private conduct,120 and (3) the “public 
function” test, which looks substantively to the nature of the function per-
formed to assess its public versus private identity.121  Any assessment of 
the Court’s state action jurisprudence reveals that, while useful as a guide-
post, these tests remain rather loosely applied.122 
As the public function test is the most frequently used in the context of 
child welfare civil rights litigation, it is the only one that will be discussed 
here at length.  It is a distinct approach to state action that focuses primarily 
on the “nature of the activity engaged in b
nquires whether the private person or entity exercises a traditional and 
exclusive state function.124  In its original incarnation, the public function 
test operated to cut through the private façade of conduct fairly attributable 
to the state, making the state responsible for private actors carrying out a 
traditional function of the state. 
The influence of the public function test can be said to have reached 
                                                          
   116 See id. 
 117 Barak-Erez, supra note  87, at 1172. 
    
equirements for Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 Pro-
tate Action to a Private Athletic Association, 69 TENN. L. REV. 521, 524 (2002). 
k-Erez, supra note 87, at 1173. 
ly-
y an official approval of the subsidized activity.  See Barak-Erez, supra note 87, at 1173–83. 
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 2:10, 2-26 (4th ed. 
 118 Michael Han, Note, Civil Rights—R
tection—Attributing S
 119 Bara
 120 Id. at 1174. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See generally Barak-Erez, supra note 87, at 1173–83.  No doubt there is merit to the claim that 
there is a serious lack of consensus methodology in the area of the state action doctrine.  The Court has 
unpredictably vacillated among and between variants of these tests, at times applying one distinctly, 
while elsewhere appearing to collapse both.  The “entwinement” theory represents such an amalgam, in 
which the nexus and public function tests are combined to ostensibly form a new test.  More recent juri-
sprudence has focused instead on the broad legal principles that unite all of the tests together.  Brent-
wood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n., 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001).  Daphne Barak-Erez 
examines Sec. 1983 claims through 4 tests, including the rarely relied upon “subsidies test.”  In app
ing a subsidies test, the Court looks to whether the financial support granted by the government is subs-
tantivel
 123 1 SHELDON 
2006). 
 124 Id. 
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ble to the state un-
der t
                                                          
Valley Plaza125, in which the Court held that a privately owned shopping 
mall could not avail itself of private trespass laws to restrict picketing by 
union employees.  Relying heavily on its earlier holding in Marsh v. Ala-
bama126, in which the Court appeared to advance an argument not terribly 
dissimilar to “if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck,” 
the Court reasoned that the privately owned mall in question was “the func-
tional equivalent of the business district” in the company town in Marsh, 
which, ostensibly public, was subject to First Amendment restrictions.127  
In so doing, the Court stretched the reach of the public function test in so 
incredulous a manner as to never again be repeated.  Indeed, in subsequent 
cases leading up through the 1980s, the Court narrowed the definition of 
public function by requiring a duality of conduct such “that the questioned 
task be a traditional and exclusive function of the State.”128  In the evolving 
iterations of the public function test, the Court would over time come to fo-
cus more narrowly on the challenged conduct than the identity of the actor. 
Two public function cases from what is collectively known as “the Blum 
trilogy” aptly depict the new narrower lens through which the public nature 
of private conduct would henceforth be assessed.129  In Blum v. Yaretsky, 
the plaintiffs attempted unsuccessfully to characterize the challenged con-
duct of a private nursing home facility as that of the state, basing their ar-
guments on the nursing home’s substantial receipt of state and federal Me-
dicaid funds as well as heavy state regulation.130  In reasoning that the 
private entity did not exercise powers “traditionally the exclusive preroga-
tive of the State,”131 the Court declined to extend the constitutional protec-
tions the plaintiffs sought into the private realm.  Similarly, in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn,132 a case which has been often analogized and heavily re-
lied upon in cases exempting private providers of child welfare services 
from accountability for constitutional harms,133 the Court found that the 
conduct of the private school employer was not attributa
he public function test because, although education of students is in-
deed a public function, the provision of such is not “the exclusive preroga-
tive of the State.”134  Nor, under this reasoning, could the employment 
related decisions of the school be attributed to the State. 
 125 391 U.S. 308 (1968). 
itle to the property belongs to a private corporation.”  Id. at 317 (quoting 
, supra note 118, at 525 (emphasis added). 
 (1982). 
rgia Dept. of Juvenile Justice, No. 7:05-cv-59 (HL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
00
2. 
 126 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 127 Amalgamated Food Employees Union, 391 U.S. at 318.  Harkening back to Marsh, the Court 
quoted from its earlier opinion, “[i]n short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely 
used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping 
center except the fact that the t
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502–503). 
 128 Han
 129 Id. 
 130 457 U.S. 991
 131 Id. at 1005. 
 132 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
 133 See, e.g., Robert S. v. Stetson, 256 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2001); Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337 (3d 
Cir. 2005); Willis v. Geo
7 12 (M.D. Ga. 2007). 
 134 Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 84
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“the 
ate law,’ one directive emerges 
The narrow focus on traditional exclusivity rendered the public func-
tion test relatively “impotent until the early 1990s,”135 when the Court held 
in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., that the use by a private litigant of 
peremptory challenges based on race was violative of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.136  Departing from the duality of con-
duct—exclusive and traditional—test that the public function inquiry had 
become after Blum, the Court instead stressed the traditional nature of the 
public function test, focusing on the attributes of the actor as well as the 
challenged conduct itself.137  Although it can be argued that, per Edmon-
son, “the Court had reset the bar to a lower level,”138 the view of some low-
er courts is that the public function test, particularly when conceived as still 
requiring conduct of a traditional and exclusive state nature, “imposes a 
‘rigorous standard’ that is ‘rarely . . . satisfied.’”139  As the logic goes, 
“[w]hile many functions have been traditionally performed by govern-
ments, very few have been ‘exclusively reserved to the State.’”140  In his
observation of the diminished influence and inherent “definitional weak-
ness” of the public function test, noted scholar Paul Verkuil suggests that 
Court . . . seems to have abandoned the quest for an adequate defini-
tion of public function,”141 perhaps a harbinger of its recurring impotency. 
V.  ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS UNDER §1983 
The first hurdle of a § 1983 claim is easily surmounted when the state 
agency alone is named as a defendant, as the agency is unquestionably a 
state actor for § 1983 purposes.  Moreover, the issue of constitutional ac-
countability was more narrowly circumscribed at a time when almost all 
child welfare services were administered by and delivered through the 
state.  Every public provider in the system was conceivably a state actor by 
formal state designation.  However, determining when and under what cir-
cumstances the thread of responsibility would be projected outwards to en-
compass private providers, in addition to or entirely apart from the state, 
remains controversial.  Although the Court offers only minimal guidance in 
determining which precise constellation of factors supports the claim that 
“a private actor has acted ‘under color of st
                                                          
 135 Han, supra note 118, at 526. 
 136 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991). 
 137 Han, supra note 118, at 526 (citing .Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624).  It can, however, be argued 
that Justice Kennedy dispensed with the need for an analysis of the exclusivity prong of the public func-
tion test in Edmonson with an earlier discussion of the unique participation of the state in which he 





noted, “[i]t cannot be disputed that, w
p mptory challenge system, as well as the jury trial system of which it is a part, simply could not ex-
ist.” Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622. 
 138 Han, supra note 118, at 526. 
 139 Robert S. v. Stetson, 256 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 
51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Ci
 140 Id. at 166 (quoting Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978)
 141 Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. 
REV. 397, at 
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144
clearly from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence: the facts are crucial.”142  
In the Court’s “often-quoted words, ‘[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private con-
duct be attributed its true significance.’”143 
The facts, indeed, do matter.  However, even in the face of sufficiently 
similar factual circumstances, courts have been inconsistent in whether 
cases involving foster children are analogous to the right to safety of incar-
cerated individuals or those involuntarily hospitalized, as the Court indi-
cated in DeShaney v. Winneb goa .   Evidence of this inconsistency in-
cludes the Supreme Court’s limited review of right-to-safety cases only in 
the context of inmates and mental patients, counterpoised with the lower 
courts’ acceptance that the doctrine applies to situations involving foster 
children injured while in care.145 
In 1989, the Court attempted to bring clarity to the complex and 
blurred lines between public and private by elaborating the circumstances 
under which the State would bear a duty to protect citizens from harms in-
flicted by private actors and the circumstances under which a § 1983 claim 
could proceed on the basis of private conduct.  In the seminal case of De-
Shaney, the Court recognized a limitation on state agency liability when 
children are harmed by private actors—in this case, the father of a child 
whose risk of harm was made known to the State child welfare agency.146  
As the Court made clear, the defining element in DeShaney was the cus-
todial context and the duty, or lack thereof, that arose from any kind of cus-
todial or special relationship between the child and the state.147  The Court 
unequivocally limited a child’s right to safety and the state’s liability for 
constitutional deprivations to only those children who were in the custody 
of the State, not those whose circumstances were merely made known to 
state officials.148  The majority opinion in DeShaney established that “noth-
ing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to 
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by pri-
vate actors.”149  Moreover, “[b]ecause there was no constitutional require-
ment that the government provide such protection, the Court reasoned the 
state could not be liable for injuries that resulted when protective services 
were not provided [to protect the child from privately-inflicted harm].”150  
                                                          
 142 Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t. Inc. 289 F.3d 231, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 143 Id. at 234 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)) (alteration 
. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989). 
, From Poverty to Abuse and Back Again: The Failure of the Legal and Social 
erv es to Protect Foster Children, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 947 (2005). 
eShaney Accountability 
in original). 
 144 DeShaney v
 145 Sharon Balmer
S ices Communiti
 146 Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 192–93. 
 147 Id. at 200. 
 148 Id. at 201–02. 
 149 Id. at 195. 
 150 Carolina D. Watts, Note, “Indifferent [Towards] Indifference”: Post-D
for Social Services Agencies When a Child is Injured or Killed Under Their Protective Watch, 30 PEPP. 
L. REV. 125, 137 (2002). 
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The Court rejected the special relationship doctrine151 that the Third Circuit 
had found persuasive in an earlier matter with similar facts and the notion 
that a constitutionally based special relationship can exist outside of a cus-
todial context.152  According to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
nd of special relationship that [can] trigger[] affirmative duties [i]s one 
in which the State takes someone into ‘custody,’ thereby depriving him of 
liberty and the ab
lle, and the developmentally disabled man in Youngberg.”153 
Pursuant to DeShaney and subsequent case law, therefore, the s
 be liable for constitutional wrongdoing visited on children in the c
 of the state: 
[I]n what has now become a famous footnote, on which many circuit courts have 
based a right to safety in foster care, the  majority opinion [in DeShaney,] pro-
vided [but did not expressly endorse,] that ‘[h]ad the State by the affirmative ex-
ercise of its power removed Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster 
home operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to 
incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to pro-
tect.154 
While post-DeShaney cases make clear that constitutional accountabil-
ity by state agencies may follow for harms suffered by children in state cus-
tody, if, for example, the standards described below are met, it remains un-
clear and inconsistent as a matter of common law under what 
circumstances constitutional accountability will extend to the private pro-
viders with whom state agencies now increasingly contract for services.  
The Court’s footnote in DeShaney, making reference to a plausible analogy 
between children in foster care and prisoners or 
d individuals, provides strong support to the argument that private 
providers contracting with the state to carry out child welfare services are 
state actors for the purposes of § 1983, thus expanding the scope of consti-
tutional accountability beyond the state itself.155 
Although divining state action has remained an unpredictable and fru-
strating exercise, Supreme Court state action jurisprudence has widened the 
                                                          
 151 See Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 13 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165, 1169 (2005) (citing Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.4). 




 of an involuntarily committed man, who had 
ts and from his own self-destructive acts. 
. at
47 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9) (third alteration in 
haney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. 
 152  Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing 
p ect a child from abuse is not limited to situations where the child is in state custody, since a s
nship between a child and agency gives rise to liability for agency’s failure to act). 
53 Oren, supra note 151, at 1170 (citing Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200).  Oren notes that: 
In Estelle, the Court acknowledged that state inaction through conscious indifference to the 
serious medical needs of an inmate, could violate the Eighth Amendment . . . .  In Young-
berg, the Court recognized a due process right
the intelligence of a very young child, to safety and protection from assaults by other pa-
tien
Id  1168 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 
(1982)). 
 154 Balmer, supra note 145, at 946–
original). 
 155 DeS
COUPET_085-128_JAM 2/14/2008 1:20 AM 
112 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:85 





, foster care case management, psychia-
tric t
                                                          
path.  Most noteworthy is the Court’s reasoning in West v. Atkins,156 which 
arguably opens the door to the extension of private provider liability, pro-
vided the analogy of foster children to prisoners is successfully made.157  In 
West, a prisoner brought suit under § 1983 against his treating physician, 
Dr. Atkins, a private orthopedist under contract to provide services on a 
part-time basis to a North Carolina state prison hospital.158  The question 
presented to the Court was whether the physician’s treatment of the prison-
er was fairly attributable to the state and, thus, whether he was acting under 
color of state law.159  The Court agreed that “the resultant deprivation was 
caused, in the sense relevant for state-action inquiry, by the State’s exercise 
of its right to punish [the prisoner] by incarceration and to deny him a ve-
nue independent of the State to obtain needed medical care.”160  The Court 
continued, explaining that “[t]he State bore an affirmative obligation to 
provide adequate medical care to [the prisoner],” which it dele
private provider.161  Because the private provider willingly assume
legated function through contract, the prisoner retained his right 
ighth Amendment claim against Dr. Atkins.162  The aim of this article 
is to extend DeShaney and West to assess the issue of constitutional ac-
countability in the context of privatized child welfare services. 
A.  Suffering the Consequences in the Absence of Accountability 
As the literature attests, the scope of the privatization debate is vast. 
This article is, however, particularly focused on the implications for child-
ren and families served by private child welfare service providers with re-
spect to constitutional deprivations suffered while in the care of private, as 
distinguished from public, providers.  The scope of private providers in-
cludes all nonprofit and for-profit providers of child welfare services, in-
cluding those providing foster care
reatment, and other related care delivered as a direct consequence of a 
child’s placement by the state into the child welfare system and the corres-
ponding custodial authority exercised by the state.  Note that this cast of 
characters includes not only private foster care agencies, but also the staff 
and foster parents they employ.163 
An illustration of the degree to which constitutional accountability 
might be compromised by the participation of private versus traditional 




loy n have legal significance, it also carries a meaningful symbolic 
ether foster parents constitute a core or fringe element of a private agency. 
9 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 156 487 U.S. 42 (1988
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 43–4
 159 Id. at 43. 
 160 Id. at 55. 
 161 Id. at 56. 
 162 Id. at 56–57. 
 163 There is marked discrepancy as to whether foster parents are considered “volunteers” or “
p ees.”  Not only does the distinctio
value with respect to wh
 164 256 F.3d 15
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laims against the school and its staff members . . . for violat-
ing h
tetson staff.173  Pursuant to the Child Protective Services Act,174 
                                                          
bert, who had been placed in the custody of the state child welfare agency 
in Pennsylvania.165  In this case, Judge Samuel Alito (now Justice Alito) 
affirmed a lower court ruling that a private treatment and educational facili-
ty specializing in the treatment and education of juvenile sex offenders was 
not a “state actor” as required for a § 1983 claim.166  Although prior to his 
death, the initial district court judge denied the defendant’s summary judg-
ment motion pertaining to the defendant’s designation as a state actor, the 
district court judge to whom the case was later transferred ruled that the de-
fendants were not state actors for the purposes of plaintiff’s § 1983 
claim.’167  In his complaint, the plaintiff, Robert S., “asserted [substantive 
due process] c
is federal constitutional rights by subjecting him to physical and psy-
chological abuse.”168  Owing to the controverted public versus private iden-
tity issues, however, Robert’s constitutional claims were quashed at the 
summary judgment phase, leaving him with only a state tort claim to take 
to the jury.169 
By way of background—and because, as in all state action inquiries, 
the facts are crucial—it is necessary to trace the plaintiff’s path from public 
to, ostensibly, private hands.  At age 13, Robert, who himself had earlier 
been sexually abused and subsequently became abusive of his younger sibl-
ing, was found to be a “dependent child” under Pennsylvania statute and 
placed in the legal and physical custody of the Philadelphia Department of 
Human Services.170  The statute defined dependency in a manner largely 
resembling that relied on in other child welfare jurisdictions across the na-
tion: to be a child who is “without proper parental care or control.”171  Al-
though the appellate opinion takes pain to note that Robert was placed in 
the custody of the state “with his mother’s consent,”172 it is clear that, un-
der the statute, no parental consent is necessary for a finding of dependen-
cy.  Not only is such consent unnecessary for the state to make a finding of 
dependency, but, in practice, such “consent” is either lacking entirely or il-
lusory in light of the state’s omnipotent power to coerce “consent” from 
vulnerable parents.  Upon removal from his mother’s custody, Robert was 
placed in a private residential institution, Stetson School, Inc., located in 
Massachusetts, which specialized in the treatment and education of juvenile 
sex offenders, where he alleged that he was physically abused by members 
of the S
 Id. at 161. 
elphia, No. 97-6710, 2000 WL 288111, at *1. n.1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 
  As will be discussed later in this article, although civil state tort claims often 
m s are an insufficient vehicle for justice. 
TAT. ANN. § 6302 (2007). 
 165 Id. at 161–62. 
 166
 167 Robert S. v. City of Philad
2000). 
 168 Stetson, 256 F.3d. at 161. 
 169 Id. at 161, 164.
re ain an option, it is my belief that such tort claim
 170 Id. at 161–62. 
 171 42 PA. CONS. S
 172 Stetson, 256 F.3d at 162. 
 173 Id. at 162–63. 
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tiffs that the school’s 
0 
disavowed in any later Supreme Court opinion.181 
                                                                                                              
Stetson was one of many privately run institutions with which the Depart-
ment of Human Services entered into a variety of financial and perfor-
mance contracts.  These contracts had the practical effect of transferring 
physical custody and direct care of dependent children to the private facili-
ties.175 
In the opinion of the Third Circuit, Stetson School, Inc., was not a 
state actor although it provided specialized treatment and education to 
children declared dependent by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or-
dered into the custody of the state and placed by an order of the state, in 
Stetson’s care.176  The Third Circuit’s reasoning relies most heavily on the 
Court’s application of the public function test in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,177 
an employment discrimination case in which the Court failed to find the de-
fendant school to be acting “under color of law” when it dismissed a school 
employee.178  Although strongly analogizing Stetson to the school in Ren-
dell-Baker, Judge Alito’s opinion selectively omits certain facts and larger 
contextual matters that would have the effect of favoring Stetson’s designa-
tion as a state actor.  The Third Circuit notes that “
pectives School in Rendell-Baker, the record here does not show t
tetson School performed a function that has been traditionally the 
ive province of the state.”179  However, what was absent from the T
uit’s opinion was a crucial analysis from the appellate opinion in Ren-
Baker v. Kohn, wherein the court stated that: 
The “public function” concept is strongest . . . when asserted by those for whose 
benefit the state has undertaken to perform a service, or when the state has lent 
its coercive powers to a private party.  In this situation, for example, those stu-
dents of the New Perspectives School who were placed there by [the state] par-
ticularly those who are compelled to attend under the state’s compulsory educa-
tion laws, would have a stronger argument than do plain
action towards them is taken “under color of’” state law, since the school derives 
its authority over them from the state. . . . The school’s authority over its faculty 
derives from the contractual relationship of employment, not from “state law,” 
[therefore, even though] [t]he school does not perform any public function to-
ward [the employees], . . . it may (although we do not now decide the issue) per-
form such a function toward some or all of its students 18
This reasoning is consistent in its theoretical underpinning with the 
Court’s analogy in Deshaney between foster children and other individuals 
whose liberty is restrained by the state.  Moreover, although understood to 
be merely dicta in Rendell Baker, this reasoning has yet to be explicitly 
                        
301 (2007). 
6 F.3d at 162. 
). 
 1189 (noting that in Rendell-Baker the Court avoided the ques-
 174 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6
 175 Stetson, 25
 176 Id. at 165. 
 177 641 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 178 Id. at 23. 
 179 Stetson, 256 F.3d at 166. 
 180 Rendell-Baker, 641 F.2d at 26 (emphasis added
 181 Barak-Erez, supra note 87, at
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Although it would be an example of unduly simplistic reasoning to 
suggest that the designation of the private party as a state actor could rest 
solely on the fact that Stetson performs a public function— the Third Cir-
cuit’s opinion appears to infer that this was the whole of plaintiff’s case.182  
To the contrary, Robert S. argued that Stetson was a state actor because the 
children were ordered by the state into its care and their harm could not 
have occurred absent the state’s exercise of coercive control over the child 
and his parents.183  Nonetheless, the Third Circuit refused to regard Ro-
bert’s placement as involuntary and instead appeared to reframe the rela-
tionship between the child, the state, and the private agency.184  In a display 
of Kafkaesque reasoning, the Third Circuit’s opinion mischaracterizes Ro-
bert’s placement as “consensual” on the mere basis that his custodian, the 
state, consented to placing him in the confines of the private facility.185  
According to this logic, wherever the state would have placed R
a locked, out-of-state residential facility, such as Stetson, or any other 
institution for that matter—his presence there would have been consensual, 
therefore forestalling any ability on his part to raise a civil rights claim 
against the facility on the basis of a deprivation of his liberty.186 
 
tion of the rights of the enrolled students who were there by the will of the state, because the petitioners 
 th ere, instead, employees of the institution). 
erein the district court reinforced the view that the removal of children from 
other consented.  Thus, his enrollment at Stetson was not ‘involunta-
’ i
ose of incarcerated prisoners, the court’s 
in e case w
 182 Stetson, 256 F.3d at 165–66. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 166–67.  In contrast to its lack of success at the appellate level, the analogy of foster 
children to other incarcerated or committed individuals was found to be persuasive in two Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania cases that preceded Stetson and Leshko.  In Estate of Earp v. Doud, No. CIV. A. 
96-7141, 1997 WL 255506 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 1997) and later in Donlan v. Ridge, 58 F. Supp. 2d 604 
(E.D. Pa. 1999), the district court recognized that foster care agencies, private and public, perform a 
function that is the exclusive prerogative of the state, “namely the removal of children from their 
homes.”  Donlan, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 609.  As Judge Fullham held in Earp, “while the day-to-day care of 
a child is not the exclusive prerogative of the state, the forcible removal of children from their homes 
most certainly is,” thus rendering a foster care organization a state actor for the purpose of § 1983 liabil-
ity.  Earp, 1997 WL 2555606 at *2.  Notably, despite the precedent set by Stetson, this reasoning found 
success yet again in Harris ex rel. Litz v. Lehigh County Office of Children & Youth Serv., 418 F. Supp. 
2d 643 (E.D. Pa. 2005) wh
the home is an exclusive public function of the state, thus conferring upon the foster care agency the 
designation of state actor. 
 185 Id. (“There is, . . . no factual basis for analogizing Robert's situation at the Stetson School to 
that of a prisoner or a person who has been involuntarily civilly committed.  Whether or not Robert, a 
minor at the time in question, personally wanted to attend the Stetson School, his legal custodian, DHS, 
wanted him placed there, and his m
ry n the sense relevant here, i.e., he was not deprived of his liberty in contravention of his legal custo-
dian’s (or his mother's) wishes.”). 
 186 Id.  The court in Stetson distinguishes Robert’s § 1983 claims from those successfully raised by 
students in Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), by pointing to both the voluntary man-
ner in which Robert was placed at Stetson and the degree of freedom Robert enjoyed while there com-
pared to students at the Provo Canyon School.  Stetson, 256 F.3d at 167.  Although the court somehow 
interprets the facts differently, it is clear from the findings in the district court that, like many of the 
students in Milonas,  Robert was there following his designation by the court as a dependent child and 
the custodial authority the state accordingly exercised over him.  Moreover, like the students in Milo-
nas, Robert had limited independence while at Stetson, where phone calls were monitored and no stu-
dent was permitted to leave campus alone without the police being notified for the purposes of affecting 
the child’s return.  Id. at 163.  While Judge Alito was correct in noting that the district court had not 
found the limitations on Robert’s freedom to be identical to th
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Not only does the Third Circuit’s opinion strain reality with respect to 
its characterization of the “voluntary” nature of Robert’s designation as a 
dependent child and his placement in foster care, it also reveals a stagger-
ing insensitivity in its failure to appropriately regard public-private partner-
ships in the context of child welfare as distinct from most others.  To assert 
that “the cooperation between the [state and the contractor] was only that 
appropriate to the execution of the subject matter of the contract and [that] 
the contractor’s ‘fiscal relationship with the State is not different from that 
of many contractors performing services for the state’”187 fails to appro-
priately capture those features that make this kind of public-private partner-
ship fundamentally different.  Although it is largely absent from the court’s 
reasoning in Stetson, the axiomatic and uncon
only the State, may involuntarily remove children from the custody of 
their parents, exercise legal and physical custody over them, and deliver 
them legally into the hands of private agents.  This overarching contextual 
factor, which would have favored finding the private agent a state actor, 
was conveniently and curiously overlooked. 
It is another Third Circuit case that highlights the risks faced by child-
ren in care whose private caregivers, paid foster parents, harm or abuse 
them.  Leshko v. Servis188 involved a case of a foster child who, alleging 
abuse by her foster parents, brought a civil rights claim against them.  The 
plaintiff, Karen M. Leshko, was two-and-a-half years old when her foster 
mother, appellee Judy Servis, placed her in the kitchen sink of the Servis 
home to wash her.189  There was a large pot of exceedingly hot water next 
to the sink and when Servis left the room, 
sustained severe burns across much of her abdomen, legs, and midsec-
tion.  Both Servis and her husband failed to seek medical treatment for Ka-
ren for more than twelve hours.190  When she reached the age of majority, 
Leshko brought suit against the county social services agency, various 
county officials, and her foster parents.191 
As distinguished from the dependent child plaintiff in Stetson, Lesh-
ko’s argument favoring classification of her foster parents as state actors 
was reasonably based on a 2002 Pennsylvania ruling holding that foster 
parents in Pennsylvania are considered county “employees” under Penn-
sylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.192  “In Pennsylvania 
‘[a]ny person who is acting or who has acted on behalf of governmental 
unit, whether on a permanent or temporary basis, whether compensated or 
 
nd om of students enrolled at Stetson” strongly 
lonas.  Id. at 169 n.11. 
 F.3d at 166 (alteration in original). 
F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2005). 
t 338. 
01 (2007).  Patterson v. Lycoming County, 815 A.2d 659, 661 
a. . Ct. 2002). 
fi ing of “obviously significant limitations on the freed
supports any analogy to the facts in Mi
 187 Stetson, 256
 188 423 
 189 Id. a
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 85
(P Commw
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tute applied to the 
Serv
shko omitted the contextual factors that 
on it
right to bodily integrity,”197 most often arising 
chological, or sexual abuse.  Despite the Supreme 
to expand recognition of a broader scope of harms as 
cons
not’ is an employee of that governmental unit.”193 Although it would ap-
pear that this classification should be to Leshko’s benefit, it was not.  Al-
though the court “acknowledge[d] the force of [Leshko’s] argument,” in 
another example of uniquely flawed logic, it failed to find these same state 
employees to be state actors for the purposes of a civil rights claim.194  
Moreover, in a proverbial “state action” catch-22, “[t]he District Court 
dismissed Leshko’s [state] tort claim against the Servises[,] . . . holding that 
the immunity provided by Pennsylvania’s tort claims sta
ises as county employees.”195  Not surprisingly, neither the district 
court, nor, later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a panel that included 
Judge Alito, authoring judge of Stetson, found that the foster parents were 
state actors as required by § 1983.  Karen Leshko has never received any 
compensation for the injuries she suffered while in care. 
Relying on its unique interpretation of West, the court in Leshko con-
cluded that state-hired private contractors are not automatically state actors 
under § 1983, even if the state is their only patron.196  Although this may be 
true, as with Stetson, the court in Le
add another layer of “publicness” to the state action landscape. Even if their 
designation by the state as official employees presents an insufficient basis 
s own on which to ground a state actor attribution, this designation in 
addition to, and in the context of, the state’s exercise of a uniquely coercive 
power should have been sufficient. 
VI.  WHY A § 1983 SUIT RATHER THAN A TRADITIONAL CIVIL TORT SUIT? 
Section 1983 provides a remedy against persons acting under color of 
state law who violate an individual’s constitutional rights.  Although it does 
not provide any substantive rights, it is a vehicle for holding accountable 
officials acting under color of law.  Claims raised under § 1983 may be re-
garded as constitutional torts, as the basis of the claim is civil, rather than 
criminal, in nature.  In the typical suit against private providers of child 
welfare services, plaintiffs allege deprivations of substantive due process 
rights under the scope of “
from physical, psy
Court’s reluctance 
titutional torts, there are several compelling justifications for framing 
the harms suffered by children in the custody of the state as constitutional 
torts rather than civil ones. 
                                                          
 193 Leshko, 423 F.3d at 342. 
rocess clause to “matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (limiting the protections afforded by the substan-
tive component of the due p
right to bodily integrity.”). 
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ered against 
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A.  Federal Forum 
The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from abusive state ac-
tion.198  The Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
was intended to grant litigants access to federal court for civil rights viola-
tions.  After its enactment in 1871, § 1983 experienced a period of dorman-
cy, until 1961 and the landmark Supreme Court case of Monroe v. Pape, in 
which the Court articulated the purpose of the state as granting private liti-
gants a federal court remedy as a first resort rather than only in default of, 
or after exhaustion of, state action. 199  As Professors Blum and Urbonya 
explain, “the statute was intended to provide a supplemental [federal] re-
medy . . . necessary to vindicate federal rights because, according to Con-
gress in 1871, state courts could not protect Fourteenth Amendment rights 
because of their ‘prejudice, passion, neglect, [and] intolerance.’”200  Fram-
ing such violations as constitutional tor
1983 as an antiviolence m
tutional deprivations inflicted by private parties acting in complicity with 
the state.  In the continuing debate over the superiority of a federal versus 
state forum for §1983 claims, many civil rights attorneys prefer litigating 
such claims in federal court, where it is believed that federal judges are 
more removed from local and state politics, and where litigants may be 
provided a more level playing field.201 
B.  Recovery 
In an era of increasing privatization, recovery can come from multiple 
sources in addition to the state agency itself.  Although as noted earlier, 
immunities to constitutional torts might attach to the conduct of state offi-
cials and possibly those private actors “dressed” in state clothes, recovery 
is not affected by civil rights damages caps to the extent that it might be 
under tort caps.  Some states have, for example, attempted to limit recovery 
from private providers of child welfare services through statutory tort 
rm.  In 2005, a bill in Texas was introduced that “propose[d] privati
of substitute child care services statewide [at the same time cappi
iability of [private] agencies providing child welfare services on beh
e state.”202  The proposed damages cap would have amended Cha
f the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to limit the liability
t part as follows: 
(a) In an action on a liability claim in which a final judgment is rend
pra note 11, at 2 (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180) (emphasis added) 
ec
 Personal Torts, 58 SMU L. REV. 1045, at 1070–71 (2005) 
iti h Leg., R.S. (2005)). 
 198 Shane, supra note 83, at 2. 
 199 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). 
 200 BLUM & URBONYA, su
(s ond alteration in original). 
 201 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 192 (6th ed. 2004). 
 202 Michael W. Shore & Judy Shore,
(c ng Tex. H.B., 79t
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mployees of a private prison management firm enjoyed a 
urt explained that be-
when op-
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children in the conservatorship of the state, the limit of civil liability for noneco-
nomic damages inclusive of all persons and entities for which vicarious liability 
theories may apply is a total amount, including prejudgment interest, not to ex-
ceed $250,000 for each person and $500,000 for each single occurrence of bodily 
injury or death. 
(b) The limitation on civil liability does not apply to reckless conduct or inten-
tional, wilful [sic], or wanton misconduct of a non-profit agency.203 
Although the measure failed to pass, efforts are clearly underway to 
protect private providers from liability at the same time that they are in-
creasingly occupying the spaces previously assumed by the government.  In 
a cautionary note, the Shores observe that while, “[i]mproving chi
tive services sho
ing child welfar
osition.”204  They argue that “[l]imiting liability of the child welfare 
service providers is particularly dangerous because the caps make it eco-
nomically feasible for them to commit negligent acts.  The service provid-
ers should know that if they fail to provide reasonable services, they will be 
held accountable for the fullest extent of their liability.”205 
C.  Immunities 
The Court’s denial of qualified immunity to private prison guards in 
Richardson v. McKnight suggests that there might be limited expansion of 
immunities to private providers of all public services.206  In assessing 
whether two e
qualified immunity from suit under § 1983, the Co
cause a private company subject to competitive market pressures 
ng a prison is already restrained in its conduct by these same market 
factors, it did not require immunity from suit in order to perform its role.207  
Although “lawsuits may well ‘distrac[t]’ these employees ‘from their . . . 
duties,’ the risk of ‘distraction’ alone cannot be sufficient grounds for an 
immunity.”208 
 203 Id. at 1071. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (denying qualified immunity to private 
prison guards in § 1983 claim).  Curiously, although the Court engaged in a thorough analysis of 
whether the private employees were entitled to qualified immunity from suit under § 1983, it passed on 
the issue of whether the private providers were even liable under § 1983.  The Court instead noted that 
since the district court had assumed, but did not decide § 1983 liability, it was for the district court to 
determine whether “under this Court’s decision in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., defendants actually 
acted ‘under color of law.’”  Id. at 413 (citation omitted). 
 207 Id. at 409.  The Court noted that the most important concern with government immunity is un-
warranted timidity.  Such a concern is less likely present in a private prison because: 
Competitive pressures mean not only that a firm whose guards are too aggressive will face 
damages that raise costs, thereby threatening its replacement, but also that a firm whose 
guards are too timid will face threats of replacement by other firms with records that dem-
onstrate their ability to do both a safer and a more effective job. 
 Id. 
 208 Id. at 411 (citations omitted). 
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D.  Artificial and Unnecessarily Forced Dichotomy 
It is implausible that in litigating a claim by a plaintiff harmed in pri-
vate care, a plaintiff would be forced to select remedies either
through a civil tort or civil rights law.  Skilled
although this is an “underutilized area of the law,” civil rights claims are 
effective in advancing the interests of children, particularly those whose 
harm is attributable to intervention by the state.209  To exclude a civil rights 
claim merely on the basis of the availability of tort remedies requires re-
liance on an artificial and unnecessarily forced dichotomy. 
E.  Expressive Theory of Constitutional Harm 
One of the less obvious, yet equally important, justifications for fram-
ing these claims as constitutional rather than civil is the ancillary effects.  
Indeed, the focus on purely monetary remedies tends to obscure the ways in 
which the law can otherwise influence behavior for the public good.  Fram-
ing harm to children in the care and custody of the state as a matter of con-
stitutional law prompts us to consider the ways in which official designa-
tion communicates a particular standard of due care, both to those so 
designated, on whom the public relies, and to the public itself.  In essence, 
it prompts us to inquire into the symbolic value of framing certain harms as 
violations of individual civil rights. 
Assuming that human behavior is significantly shaped by the frame-
work within which interactions occur, it is reasonable to assume that in a 
private, versus public, setting, the inculcation of public values is less likely 
to guide individual conduct.  I posit that designating the wrongdoer as a 
public figure, thereby framing the harm as a constitutional violation, will 
assist in establishing “rules so clearly defined and so generally accepted as 
effectively to control the actions of [private providers as they do] public of-
ficers.”210  Framing harms as constitutional in nature challenges the private 
agencies to comport themselves, and to order the conduct of their em-
ployees, in a way consistent with their designation as “agents of the 
state”—ideally placing public good above profit, and injecting public-
oriented professionalism where an ethos of entrepreneurship may now do-
minate.  In the most tangible example of the expressive ways in which a 
designation or label communicates a “public” persona, with all the atten-
 209 Telephone Interview with Thomas F. Johnson, Esq., attorney in V.M. v. City of Philadelphia.  
(Jan. 16, 2007).  Mr. Johnson was the plaintiff’s representative in a tragic case of systemic failure on the 
part of Philadelphia DHS, the private child welfare agency with whom it contracted, and the child’s 
own public guardian.  In what is described as “one of the city government’s biggest civil-rights awards 
in memory,” the plaintiff was awarded a multi-million dollar settlement for harm she suffered while in 
the care of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services and the direct supervision of a private 
agency, Tabor Children’s Services, who was paid by DHS to help oversee the child’s foster care place-
ment.  Ken Dilanian, A Tragedy that Money Can’t Fix, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 22, 2006, at A1.  Interes-
tingly, according to Mr. Johnson, the private provider, Tabor Children’s Services, did not challenge its 
designation as a state actor for the purposes of the suit and instead settled with the plaintiff for a sum of 
$1 million.  Telephone Interview with Thomas F. Johnson, supra. 
 210 Shane, supra note 83, at 6. 
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dant public responsibilities, it would be unthinkable to not require some po-
lice officers, at least those who interact regularly with the public, to don 
uniforms that identify themselves as officers.  The uniforms—the veritable 
“garb” of the state—represent and communicate something to the officer 
and to the public:
ly speculative; we could easily measure the effect of state actor desig-
nation on ostensibly private actors.  It is a question worthy of further em-
pirical inquiry whether state actor attribution would translate into more 
“caring” or “responsible” providers or whether an official designation 
would provide private actors a greater incentive to adhere to a particular 
standard of care. 
This communicative or expressive justification for state actor designa-
tion rests on a subjective application of the state action test, not from the 
vantage of the alleged state actor, but from the vantage of children and 
families in the system who are the direct objects of the state’s actions.  Ap-
plying the subjective expressivist theory advanced by Professor Godsil, this 
argument challenges the belief that “the meaning of government action 
should be determined from the perspective of an ‘objective observ-
er,’. . . [since] this objective observer standard [falsely] presumes that dif-
ferent . . . groups place the same meaning upon the expressive content of a 
government action that affects them differently.” 211  In challenging this 
“universal” objective observer standard, Godsil acknowledges that “in 
charged contexts, the same actions or set of circumstances may be per-
ceived very differently depending on the perspective of the observer . . . . 
[And that] the meaning assigned to such actions is inherently ro
perspective of the pers
meaning of a governm
nable member of the allegedly affected community,”213 Godsil’s ar-
gument supports relying on the perspective of those ordered into state care 
to assess whether they perceive the private providers in whose care they 
 211 Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 247, 250 
(2003).  Although Professor Godsil does not use expressivist theory in the context of substantive due 
process rights, as I am attempting to do herein, I find her argument for a subjective assessment of harm 
in the context of governmental expression particularly useful.  She attributes a restatement of expressiv-
ist theory to Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes who she says “posit that the legality of an actors’ 
conduct is dependent upon whether that conduct ‘expresses appropriate attitudes toward various subs-
tantive values.’  Actions that convey attitudes that are contrary to accepted norms constitute ‘expressive 
harms.’”  Id. at  274.  As Godsil explains: 
An expression is an action, statement, or any other expressive vehicle that manifests a state 
of mind.  The state of mind can be cognitive—beliefs, ideas or theories—but can also in-
clude “moods, emotions, attitudes, desires, intentions, and personality traits.”  Expression 
can also take place at the level of state action, where policies and deliberative principles 
can be interpreted as “expressing official state beliefs and attitudes.”  The role of expres-
sion is to bring a state of mind into the open for others to recognize and interpret.  A partic-
ular action, statement or other vehicle may be more or less successful in conveying the 
state of mind of the actor. 
Id. at 274. 
 212 Id. at 250. 
 213 Id. at 247. 
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have been delivered to be state actors or merely private persons. 
F.  Missing the Mark 
Confusion in case law on the matter of liability of private providers 
arises from the focus on a number of arguably irrelevant factors that courts 
have nonetheless relied on when attempting to discern the degree of “pub-
licness” or “privateness” of service delivery.  I assert that these factors miss 
the mark with respect to the key underlying feature that bears the ultimate 
mark of “publicness”—exclusive state dominion. 
Perhaps through a lack of understanding, experience, or empathy, 
courts that have failed to find private providers to be state actors have also 
rejected a more precise discernment of the role of the state in the tradition 
of child welfare, focusing instead on the mere participation of private par-
ties in the provision of direct care.  However, mere participation of private 
parties does not render the conduct itself wholly private, just as the mere 
participation of a state actor does not cloak the conduct under the garb of 
the state.  The strongest example of this axiom would be in the area of pri-
vatized .  Altho
oviding correctional services, most courts would be reluctant to regard 
incarceration as an historically wholly private affair.214  There is something 
distinctly governmental about the deprivation of liberty that characterizes 
prisons, and something sufficiently parallel to the experience of children 
and families in foster care to warrant finding private providers to be state 
actors. 
Both the Stetson and Leshko opinions take pains to note the presence 
or absence of parental consent to the placement of a child in state care. As 
noted earlier, such consent is either unnecessary or entirely illusory in the 
context of the authority wielded by the state against families in h
are system.215  Although the Third Circuit did not explain at lengt
on, it appears that the reluctance to analogize Robert’s plight to t
ther involuntarily civilly comm
 to be based on an assumption that because minors are perpetually de-
prived of their liberty, they have as such no independent constitutional 
claims that can be based on facts suggestive of deprived liberties.216 
VII.  RECALIBRATING THE STATE ACTION TEST IN A NEW ERA OF 
PRIVATIZED CHILD WELFARE 
of the traditional state action doctrine and the failure to account for the my-
riad of services that fall within the category of inherent governmental func-
                                                   
pra note 14, at 9 (tracing the private sector involvement back to 
or
 214 AUSTIN & COVENTRY, su
sh tly after the first English colonists arrived in Virginia in 1607). 
 215 Robert S. v. Stetson School, Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 162, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2001);  Leshko v. Servis, 
423 F.3d 337, 338, 347 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 216 Stetson, 256 F.3d at 169. 
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remo
tions strengthens the call for a new state action test—one that assesses the 
intrinsic governmental nature of the function, and one that better reflects 
our current privatization realities.217  Under an “intrinsic governmental 
function” test, rather than focus on the “traditional” and “exclusive” nature 
of the relationship, a new state action doctrine would regard the intrinsical-
ly public nature of the function and the corresponding actor delegated to 
carry it out as sufficiently indicative of state action.218  Under such an anal-
ysis, the uniquely coercive character of the state intervention must form the 
backdrop against which any state actor designation is made.  Although in-
cluding factors related to the history of public-private partnerships, an “i
ic governmental function” test would more appropriately recognize the 
exclusive kind of coercion that the state exercises when exploring the rela-
tionship between the private provider and the contracting public agency. 
Although this is not a position advanced in this article, Professor Ba-
rak-Erez notes that “[a]nother way to criticize the constraints of the current 
doctrine is by revealing its unjustified differentiation between state con-
tracting with individuals and state contracting with a [corporation].”219  In 
an argument embedded with strains of the Court’s symbiotic relation
 she observes that the contractual relationship that essentially binds 
loyee to the state might have equal force when exploring the liabilit
ate agencies contracting with the state.  According to Barak-Erez, 
The Supreme Court never doubted that public sector employees are state actors 
. . . .  However, looking more closely at the matter, public employees are identi-
fied with the state due to their contractual relations with it and, sometimes, the 
statutory powers given to them.  Given this basis, close contractual relations, 
sometimes coupled with statutory status, should equally suffice with regard to 
corporations operating public institutions or public services.220 
The key focus of a new state action test should involve an inquiry into 
whether the function “necessarily involve[s] the power properly reserved to 
the sovereign” or whether “the function is largely private in character, re-
quiring none of the coercive powers of the sovereign” to be achieved.221  
Although the case for the continued use of the traditional state action doc-
trine is based, in part, on the interest of preserving freedom in the private 
domain from unnecessarily rigid restrictions, this argument proves to be ra-
ther misleading, especially in the case
ved from their homes, where such protections from harm are cru-
cial.222  The focus on the protection of private providers over that of vul-
                                                          
 217 See Sullivan, supra note 8 (noting varieties of arrangements between governments and private 
service providers that immunize both government and private groups from constitutional restraints un-
der the Supreme Court’s current state action jurisprudence).  “Function” as used in the proposed “intrin-
sic governmental function test” is defined for these purposes as the care of children removed by the 
state. 
 218 See Metzger, supra note 9, at 1369. 
 219 Barak-Erez, supra note 87, at 1187. 
 220 Id. 
 221 See Moe, supra note 79, at 457. 
 222 Barak-Erez, supra note 87, at 1185–86. 
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nerable child
The [critical] question is not whether “pure” private enterprises should 
be free of constitutional limitations.  The question is how to conceptualize 
the divisions between public and private—whether privatized enterprises 
are always “private,” or sometimes serve as new actors in the public do-
main.  The question is really whether old tests should be applied to new 
realities.223 
Ironically, it is the Third Circuit that again offers a relevant example 
in the attempt to discern a new state action test better, although imperfectly, 
reflective of the kind of line-drawing necessary in addressing the new pub-
lic-private partnerships in child welfare.  In a case, C.K. v. Northwestern 
Human Services,224 which followed Stetson but preceded Leshko, the dis-
trict court looked not only to the identity of the defendants, but to the pur-
pose of the child’s placement in finding that the private providers were 
state actors under § 1983.  C.K. involved a child found to be delinquent and 
placed in the care of a private residential facility, Northwestern Acade-
my,225 where she alleged that she was sexually abuse 226 The district court 
found t
 pursuant to a state court order, were state actors acting under color
 law because they were performing a quintessentially governmen
tion.227  The court described the purpose of her commitment to No
tern Academy as rehabilitation, which it considered to be “a power t
aditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”228  According to 
t, 
We see no basis to reach a different result than in 
Northwestern Academy is a juvenile facility for delinquent children rather than a 
prison for adults.  Both house persons involuntarily deprived of their liberty as a 
result of judicial process.  Moreover, the court in Stetson, in finding no state ac-
tion by a school for ‘dependent child[ren],’ was careful to distinguish it from an 
institution for  ‘delinquent child[ren].’  The court’s opinion, as we read it, strong-
ly suggests that it would have found state action had Stetson been an entity hav-
ing custody of children in the latter category.229   
 223 Id. 
 224 255 F. Supp. 2d 447 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
 225 Id. at 448.  Northwestern Academy is a subsidiary of a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, 
Northwestern Human Services, Inc., “which provides a variety of services to children and adults in 
Pennsylvania.”  Id. 
 226 Id.  For the purposes of my argument, it is irrelevant to distinguish between findings of depen-
dency and delinquency.  The literature addressing children in state care supports the understanding that 
both systems operate for the purpose of treatment and rehabilitation of children and families.  Moreo-
ver, many child welfare statutes, such as that in Stetson and C.K. have some overlapping distinctions of 
delinquency and dependency.  For example, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (2007) defines a “delin-
quent” child as one who is “ten years of age or older whom the court has found to have committed a 
delinquent act and is in need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation” and defines a “dependent” 
child as one “under the age of ten [that] has committed a delinquent act.” 
 227 C.K., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. 
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According to the district court, the only manner in which the Stetson 
court was willing to regard Robert as similarly situated to a prisoner were if 
he had been adjudicated delinquent rather than dependent.  However, given 
that both designations—dependent and delinquent—fall within the scope of 
child welfare law, with the broadly defined aims of rehabilitation, treatment 
and substitute care, any distinction between the two, at least as it shapes the 
identity of the private provider, should be irrelevant.  It is
I view the reasoning in C.K., which reflects the same assumption, to be 
imperfect.  Nonetheless, the court looked to the uniqueness of the role 
played by the state—to care for children deprived of  their liberty—in attri-
buting a public identity to the private providers.  In a more sufficiently 
keyed application of the state action test, the court in C.K. explored not on-
ly the “links between the private person and the state, but also . . . the signi-
ficance of each tie and the cumulative effect of the ties.”230 
In a hypothetical applicati
 injured by a foster parent or staff member of a residential facility, the 
child would retain a right to pursue a civil rights claim for deprivation of a 
constitutional right if the child’s placement in that setting were a direct re-
sult of the state’s unique, exclusive and intrinsic authority to remove child-
ren from their homes, thereafter delivering them to the care of others.  In 
this sense, the intrinsic governmental test largely resembles the approach 
embraced by the court in C.K. 
On a practical matter, even in the absence of a new state action test, 
state child welfare agencies should continue to be alarmed about minimal 
or flawed accountability under the current contracting scheme.  As pre-
viously discussed, few state agencies have sufficient staff devoted to re-
viewing private agency compliance with contractual terms.  Moreover, 
there will always be a lack of meaningful review if the criteria for review 
are simply target percentages of the number of parents who will be satisfied 
with s
a more robust
 the thesis of this art
e of foster care placement—one that reasonably parallels the circums-
tance faced by prisoners and individuals involuntarily committed by the 
state—courts should be more willing to extend liability for constitutional 
deprivations to those who contract with public agencies for the provision of 
care. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Regardless of where one stands in the debate on privatized child wel-
fare services, it is clear that these longstanding public-private partnerships 
will continue to exist in some form or another.  That said, the rush to priva-
tization must be tempered by measured concern for the level and effective-
 230 BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 11, at 11. 
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ness of accountability, constitutional and otherwise, to all relevant parties. 
As it is currently conceived and implemented—often with only vague 
outcome measures, minimal oversight, and lax accountability—privatized 
child welfare services fail to sufficiently safeguard child well-being.  The 
failure to address overall well-being is, moreover, accentuated within the 
context of privatized service delivery as the concept is, in and of itself, a 
challenging one to operationalize, let alone accurately assess, as a function 
of performance-based contracting, the now accepted metric in public-
private partnerships.  Many existing privatization models currently rely on 
outcome criteria that are not designed for human service evaluation, but ra-
ther a managed care model for delivery of health care.  Reasonable argu-
ments have been raised that the matter of safeguarding against harm and 
building in accountability can only be appropriately addressed with proper-
ly drafted contracts. 
It is clear that privatization works best in the context of limited, dis-
crete and easily measurable outputs.  Think of the privatization of trash col-
lection where the output is clearly delineated and assessed—trash must be 
picked up regularly.  There are many similar transactions in the market-
place, with each private trash collection agency competing to deliver better 
performance within a fairly narrow range of measurable output.  Moreover, 
because government can contract out trash collection or even allow con-
sumers to select from government and non-government providers, trash 
collection is not an intrinsic governmental function.  Since “[p]rivatization 
becomes less successful as the number of outcomes increases and their 
quantification is on different measurement scales[,]”231 the use of out-
comes-based metrics is too complex and ill-suited to the human service 
work that is at the core of child welfare.  At the provider level, as well as at 
the direct service level, the focus should be on precisely defined longitu-
dinal and well-being based assessments with recognition that they might 
very well clash with the fiscal demands of private for-profit and nonprofit 
agenci s e and the timeframe of most public-private contract arrangements.
As Professor Kennedy notes, when it comes to purchasing the care and 
control of drug addicts, the safety and nurturing of children, the relief of 
hunger and the regulation of family life through child welfare interventions 
from private agencies, core values other than economic efficiency are at 
stake.232  We must recognize “that the impact of this transformation on the 
future of the American welfare state has not received adequate atten-
tion.”233 
Even while acknowledging the importance of contract drafting, moni-
toring, and compliance, it is critical to admit that these interventions will do 
little to remedy actual harms caused to service recipients, and whose claims 
 231 Blackstone & Hakim, supra note 57, at 489. 
 232 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 207. 
 233 Id. at 206 (quoting STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE 11 
(1993)). 
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te agency 
that 
logy, it is easy to see how some public-private part-
nerships are more analogous to private exchanges of goods or services than 
others.  Among the dispositive elements that must be considered are “the 
existence, nature and extent of government funding; the nature and extent 
of go ent control of the activity in question; the extent to which gov-
ernm nt has authorized a contractor to exercise government powers; and a 
functional (holistic) analysis.”235  It is my hope that this piece will add to 
the ongoing dialogue. 
                                                          
can only be addressed in the course of litigation.  Unlike the sta
may cancel or decide not to renew contracts with private agencies on 
the basis of poor performance, the direct recipient of care has no remedy 
arising from contract compliance or performance monitoring, but only from 
suit brought against the state and/or private agencies that delivered his or 
her care.  It is here where constitutional claims raised by plaintiffs have 
slipped through the cracks, as courts have clumsily attempted to graft an 
antiquated state action doctrine onto a new public-private reality. 
The aim of this article has been to highlight this more particularly 
troubling aspect of the privatization transformation—that “[i]f the state ac-
tion doctrine does not change to accommodate new realities, we are in dan-
ger of losing an important constitutional check on the exercise of adminis-
trative power.”234  It is evident that any workable state action doctrine will 
require flexible application, especially during a period in which we are 
“reinventing” government.  That said, however, flexibility need not trump 
consistency and predictability.  Certain characteristics of the relationship 
between government and private entities will always be relevant to the in-
quiry of whether an action can be fairly attributed to the state.  Again using 















 234 Id. at 207. 
 235 Id. at 219. 
